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I. INTRODUCTION
The application of genetic modification in agriculture offers remarkable
benefits not only for farmers, but also for consumers. This technological
development promises the increase in productivity and decrease in chemicals
used in agriculture. In addition, the technology also offers enhanced taste, better
nutritional ingredients, and cheaper products for consumers.' For example, some
studies show that the decrease in the use of pesticides and herbicides corresponds
to the increased adoption of, respectively, insect-resistant crops and herbicide-
tolerant crops.2 Authors have also argued that the rapid adoption of genetically
modified (GM) crops occurs because farmers gain remarkable economic benefits
from adopting GM crops, including the reduction of chemical sprays, yields
improvement, increased yields, labor savings, and the shifts to a system that
requires less tillage.
Scientists are also developing crops able to resist environmental stresses, such
as drought, and contain nutritional contents, such as vitamin A, which are
especially beneficial for people in poor countries. Genetically Modified Organ-
isms (GMOs) are thus another miracle created by humans, both to increase profits
and overcome hunger and malnourishment. Many developing countries have
embraced this technology with the hope that this technology will help' the
1. See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law of Genetic
Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 807, 810 (2001).
2. L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290
SCI. 2088, 2090-91 (2000).
3. Martina McGloughlin, Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology Will Be Important to the Developing World, 2
AGBIOFORUM 163, 165-66 (1999); see also Janet Carpenter & Leonard Gianessi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans:
Why Growers are Adopting Roundup Ready Varieties, 2 AGBioFORUM 65, 68-69 (1999) (arguing growers are
switching to a particular weed control program because of its simplicity and flexibility). Similarly, Kalaitzandon-
akes summarizes the farmers' economic benefits from adopting GM crops in terms of cost reductions in pest
management, increased yields, improved insurance against pests, time savings, reduction in equipment due to
no tillage is required, and land-use efficiency gains. Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes, A Farm Level Perspective on
Agrobiotechnology: How Much Value and for Whom?, 2 AGBioFORuM 61, 62 (1999).
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countries boost their agricultural productivity. Despite these promises, GMOs, as
a relatively new technology, also impose potential adverse effects on human
health and the environment. Public concerns have surfaced, and although
uncertain at this time, these possible effects might be irreversible and uncontrol-
lable once they materialize.4Notwithstanding the potential benefits of GMOs as
far as overcoming hunger (a major concern for most of the developing world
today) there is indeed also major concern with respect to the potential negative
consequences of the use of GMOs. One such risk is the issue of co-mingling
between non-GM and GM crops. As a result of this admixture, GM crops could
also be found in the food or feed production chain of non-GM crops.5 Damage
could also result, for example, from the fact that genes of GM crops designed to
be tolerant for the application of certain herbicides (herbicide tolerant crops)
have the potential of flowing to their weedy relatives, which could then result in
the development of herbicide resistant hybrids. This could increase the cost of
weed controls and place pressure on the environment as farmers are forced to
resort to chemicals that are possibly more toxic.'
Other concerns relate to the fact that some GM crops may be insect-resistant.
These crops have been genetically modified with genes from bacillus thuringien-
sis, referred to as Bt crops. Insects eating these crops will be killed, but these
self-producing pesticide plants may create several environmental problems, such
as the development of pest-resistance.
With the growing use and international trade of GM crops or products, the
question arises as to who should be held liable if those potential adverse impacts
eventually materialize. Liability and redress are thus important aspects accompa-
nying the development and commercialization of GMOs. The importance of
liability and redress has been addressed in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
which calls for parties to adopt appropriate international rules and procedures in
the field of liability and redress. 8
4. Applegate argues that the dangers posed by genetic engineering are real. They may take form as weeds,
pests, and diseases that are invasive and resistant to chemical control, as well as the degradation of genetic
diversity, and as novel toxins and food allergies. John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the
Precautionary Principle to Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 207, 208 (2001).
5. It is, however, debated, to what extent this risk of co-mingling between GM and non-GM crops does
necessarily create economic damage for e.g. organic farms. See Drew L. Kershen, Legal Liability Issues in
Agricultural Biotechnology, 44 CROP Sa. 456, 457 (2004).
6. See David E. Ervin et al., Towards an Ecological Systems Approach in Public Research for Environmental
Regulation of Transgenic Crops, 99 AGRIC., EcosysTEMs & ENv'T 1, 5. (2003).
7. See Sandra S. Batie, The Environmental Impacts of Genetically Modified Plants: Challenges to Decision
Making, 85 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 1107, 1108 (2003); Wolfenbarger & Phifer, supra note 2, at 2089-92
(discussing effects of Bt crops on non-target species and development of resistance to Bt toxins).
8. In this regard, one may refer to Article 27 of the Cartagena Protocol, which reads:
"The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first
meeting, adopt a process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of international rules and
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One aspect closely related to the issue of liability is the requirement that the
damage incurred should be foreseeable at the time the damaging activity occurs.
The issue of foreseeability inevitably requires an analysis of the possible impact
of GMOs, which may have different levels of certainty. It is in this regard that the
precautionary principle has been proposed in order to lessen the foreseeability
requirement. Incorporating the precautionary principle into liability thus means
that despite current uncertainties concerning some impacts of GMOs, GM
operators will be held liable if these effects materialize and their GM products
turn out to be harmful.
This paper attempts to provide an economic analysis regarding the application
of liability rules and the incorporation of the precautionary principle into liability
schemes for damage caused by GMOs. The economic analysis of law has
generally paid considerable attention to the question of how legal instruments,
and legal rules in particular, can promote social welfare in society. In addition,
much of law and economics research has focused on uncertainties that arise as a
result of the use of GMOs. In that respect, for example, questions arise as to
whether GMOs should be used at all when uncertainties arise regarding their
consequences, particularly the consequences for third parties. This led to chal-
lenges, for example, with respect to the application of the well known precaution-
ary principle.9
In the introduction it should be stated that for an economic analysis it is always
important to make a distinction between prevention and compensation. For an
economist, liability rules should primarily have a preventive effect, and thus
provide incentives to those dealing with GMOs in order to prevent damage from
occurring to third parties. In economic literature this preventive goal is distin-
guished from ex post compensation. Ex post compensation can be provided
through a variety of mechanisms. Tort law is not usually considered a tool for
compensation in economic literature; rather, the main goal of tort law for
economists is its preventive mechanism. Hence, it is insurance or compensation
funds that could fulfill this particular objective.
This contribution is structured as follows: first, the paper will discuss possible
impacts of GMOs (H1). The discussion will then turn to the types of liability
applicable to GMO risks; this is the core of the paper, since a distinction will be
made between the general case where victims are third parties, the application of
liability rules to environmental damage, and the product liability case (III). An
important and debated issue in GMO liability is the question of how one should
deal with causation. That will be dealt with in detail in Section IV. Related to the
procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting from transboundary movements of
living modified organisms, analysing and taking due account of the ongoing processes in international
law on these matters, and shall endeavour to complete this process within four years."
9. Cf. Helle Tegner Anker & Margaret Rosso Grossman, Authorization of Genetically Modified Organisms:
Precaution in U.S. and EC. Law, 4 EUR. FOOD AND FEED L. REv 3 (2009) (Ger.).
[Vol. 23: 14
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causation issue is the question of how liability should be allocated if the damage
is not caused by one tortfeasor, but if multiple tortfeasors are involved (V).
Defendants in a GMO related liability case may be able to call on. several
defenses which are discussed in Section VI. Finally, the question arises, if
liability of the defendant is accepted, what remedies are available for the plaintiff.
This involves inter alia a discussion of damages, including the question of
whether from an economic perspective there should be liability for so called pure
economic loss, as well as the questions of whether an injunction can be sought
for, and whether compulsory insurance may be indicated. These issues related to
remedies are addressed in Section VII. We formulate concluding remarks in
Section VI.
H. POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF GMOs
As stated earlier, despite all promises of the potential benefits, the development
and commercialization of GMOs also have a potential negative impact on
humans and the environment. Discussion about these impacts is important not
only to explain possible damage caused by .GMOs, but also to provide an
overview 6f the debate considering these impacts, which is especially useful for
the discussion of defenses and foreseeability.
In addition to human health problems,' 0 GMOs may also create adverse
environmental impacts, some of which are feared to be catastrophic. Typical
concerns about the environmental impacts of GMOs can be summarized as
follows:
A. GENE TRANSFER
There are, at least, three separate issues related to gene transfer from GM
crops." The first issue arises when a GM crop from one land cross-pollinates
10. Concerns over the impacts on human health include the issue of allergen and the use of antibiotic as gene
marker. For discussion about possible impacts on human health, see generally Anita Bakshi, Potential Adverse
Health Effects of Genetically Modified Crops, 6 J. TOXICOLOGY AND ENvTL. HEALTH, PART B: CRITICAL REviEws
211 (2003).
11. Once released into the environment, genes from GM crops may be transferred, through several possible
ways, into the genes of other plants. According to the Royal Society of Canada, GM crops can be categorized in
the possibility for gene transfer into: 1) no possibility, where wild relatives are absent from the region where the
crop is grown; 2) low possibility, where crops species are either predominantly self-propagated (e.g., many
cereals) or are infrequently propagated by sexual reproduction and flower (e.g., sweet potato, sugar cane); and
3) moderate to high possibility, where the crops are grown in an area where their sexually compatible wild
relatives are present (e.g. canola in Europe and North America, and rice in South East Asia). ROYAL Soc'Y CAN.,
ELEMENTs OF PRECAUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CANADA: AN
EXPERT PANEL REPORT ON THE FuTuRE OF FOOD BIOTEcHNOLOGY 124-25 (2001), available at http://www.rsc.cal
files/publications/expert-panels/foodbiotechnology/GMreportEN.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2011) (hereinafter
RSC). Others have characterized the risks of genes flow as follows: a) Very low and low risks; crops in this
group show low level, or even do not show evidence at all, of cross-pollination with wild relatives. Corn,
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with a non-GM crop of the same species from surrounding land. Where GM
crops are grown in the same region as non-GM cultivars, opportunities for
cross-pollination exist. One of the most cited studies about this issue is the work
of Quist and Chapela published in Nature in 2001, which observed that genes
from GM corn had been transferred, referred to as "introgression," into non-GM
corn fields in Mexico.12 Economic damage from the gene-transfer ranges from a
possible loss of certification as an organic farm, to losing markets because the
products have been "contaminated" by GM crops.13 In addition, there is also a
real possibility that a farmer whose land has been polluted by a neighboring GM
farm could even be found guilty of patent infringement. 14
The second issue of gene flow corresponds to the invasiveness of new hybrids
from GM crops and their wild relatives.15 GM crops, such as herbicide-tolerant
and insect-resistant crops, have phenotypes that are designated to increase the
fitness of these crops. Such fitness-related enhancement traits could be trans-
ferred into wild relatives. 16 The invasiveness of new hybrids could replace the
wild species and, hence, reduce the genetic diversity and uniqueness of wild-
soybean, tomato, and potato are considered to belong to this group; b) Moderate risk; crops, such as alfalfa,
sugar beet, and sunflower, could be included into this moderate group. These species have the same genus and
similar chromosomes numbers with wild relatives, and there is some evidence about hybridisation of these
species with their wild relatives; c) High risk; crops belong to this group are considered to hybridise easily with
their wild relatives. Examples of these crops include canola and sorghum. Allison A. Snow & Pedro MorAn
Palma, Commercialization of Transgenic Plants: Potential Ecological Risks, 47 BIOSCIENCE 86, 91.(1997); C.
Neal Stewart Jr., Matthew D. Halfhill & Suzanne I. Warwick, Transgene Introgression from Genetically
Modified Crops to Their Wild Relatives, 4 NATURE REvIEws GENETICS 806, 810-12 (2003).
12. For'a complete result, see David Quist & Ignacio H. Chapela, Transgenic DNA Introgressed into
Traditional Maize Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 NATURE 541 (2001).
13. Concerns of losing the entire organic market due to the mixture of crops has motivated Canadian groups
of organic farmers to sue two giant GMO producers, Monsanto and Aventis. The farmers argue that the entire
organic market for wheat, worth as much as $17.5 million, is threatened due to the commercialization of GM
wheat in Canada. See Aaron Bouchie, Organic Farmers Sue GMO Producers, 20 NAruRE BIOTECHNOLOGY 210,
210(2002).
14. One could refer here to the famous Monsanto v. Schmeiser case, in which the Canadian court found the
defendant guilty for infringement of Monsanto's patent rights for herbicide-resistant canola. See Jeffrey L. Fox,
Canadian Farmer Found Guilty of Monsanto Canola Patent Infringement, 19 NArURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 396,
396-397 (2001). The ruling of the court in this case has, however, been severely criticized as the court ignored
the fact that the defendant did not use glyphosate, herbicide which the patented GM canola is supposed to resist.
Some authors argue that if the possession of hybrids containing the patented gene is considered a sufficient
ground for the infringement of a patent right, then the court should have seriously take into account the question
of the defendant's intent. Otherwise, a farmer whose land has been contaminated by GM crops, and hence, who
unwillingly grows the hybrids, will be found guilty for patent infringement. See Maria Lee and Robert Burrell,
Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the 'Victim'?, 65 MOD. L. REv. 517, 523-525 (2002), see also
Hilary Preston, Drift of Patented Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability Theories, 81 TEx. L. REv.
1153, 1167-1169 (2003).
15. Although crop-to-wild hybridisation has already been a common phenomenon in agriculture for years,
the introduction of GM crops could increase the likelihood of such a hybridisation to occur.
16. Norman C. Ellstrand, When Transgenes Wander Should We Worry?, in ENGINEERING THE FARM: THE
SocIAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY 61, 65 (Britt Bailey & Marc Lapp6 eds., 2002).
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native populations.17 In this regard, as Johnson has argued, the acquisition of
resistance in wild plants may change plant population dynamics, increasing the
risks of their invading agricultural land and natural ecosystems.1 8
The greatest concern regarding genes transfer is perhaps the possibility that the
transfer from GM crops to their sexually compatible wild relatives may result in
unwanted hybrids that are more persistent. According to Ervin et al., there is little
doubt among scientists that genes will wander from crops into the wild. They
argue that the relevant questions are whether transgenes will survive in the wild
and how they confer a certain trait to particular wild plants that make such plants
more difficult to control.1 9 This means that the real issue is not whether genes will
move, but rather whether they could survive and increase the so-called "weedi-
ness" (persistence) of unwanted wild plants. Some studies in Western Canada
show that three different herbicide-resistant canola (rape) varieties have cross-
pollinated to create canola plants that are resistant to multiple types of herbi-
cide. 2 0 The presence of such a "superweed" could force farmers to use older and
less environmentally friendly herbicides. 2 1 In this regard, the large-scale introduc-
tion of GM crops might, therefore, change wild-weedy relatives into new and less
manageable weeds.22 Along with the creation of invasive hybrids, the presence of
persistent hybrids, which require a more toxic application of herbicides, could
also be considered a threat to the biological diversity of weeds in the natural
ecosystems.23
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESISTANCE
The introduction of novel crops with fitness-enhanced genes could lead to an
undesirable effect of resistance. Some biologists believe that eventually weeds
will begin to develop resistance, and, hence, more application of -possibly
17. See Wolfenbarger & Phifer, supra note 2, at 2088. If, however, the hybrids show lower fitness than their
parents, the wild population may shrink. Hence, hybridisation seems to create a problematic situation between
the shrink of population and the invasiveness of the hybrids. See D.A. Andow & Claudia Zwahlen, Assessing
Environmental Risks of Transgenic Plants, 9 ECOLOGY LETrERs 196, 200 (2006).
18. Brian Johnson, Genetically Modified Crops and Other Organisms: Implications for Agricultural
Sustainability and Biodiversity, in AGRIC. BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE POOR 131, 133 (G.J. Persley & M. M. Lantin
eds., Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 2000).
19. David E. Ervin et al., supra note 6, at 5.
20. One of the studies shows that the spontaneous hybridisations occurred among three varieties of canola,
two of which were transgenic canola, when they were planted close to one another. The hybridisation of these
varieties, each of which was resistant to glufosinate, imidhzolinone and glyphosate, has resulted in hybrid
volunteers that were resistant to more than one of these herbicides. In addition, the study also found that the
resistant alleles were able to move rapidly. Norman C. Ellstrand, Current Knowledge of Gene Flow in Plants:
Implications for Transgene Flow, 358 PHIL. TRANs. R. Soc. LOND. B. 1163, 1167 (2003).
21. RSC, supra note 11, at 122-23.
22. Miguel A. Altieri, The Ecological Impacts of Transgenic Crops on Agroecosystem Health, 6(1)
ECOsYsTEM HEALTH 13, 16 (2000).
23. Philip J. Dale et al., Potential for the Environmental Impact of Transgenic Crops, 20 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 567, 571 (2002).
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increasingly toxic herbicides will be required.24 Krimsky and Wrubel predict that
the widespread use of herbicide resistant crops is likely to increase the reliance on
a few herbicides." Such widespread use of crops developed for resistance to
single herbicides could put more pressure on weeds to evolve resistance to these
herbicides. 2 6 Therefore, herbicide tolerant crops developed for a single applica-
tion of certain herbicides could increase the likelihood of resistant development
in weeds. To control these stronger weeds, farmers might resort to other
chemicals that are possibly more toxic or to more aggressive tillage techniques
that are likely to create soil erosion problems.27
The possibility of resistance development by insects has also been shown.
Some studies, at least in laboratory experiments, have observed the existence of
insects that can develop their resistance to Bt toxins.28 With this evidence, one
could argue that the release of GMOs into the environment could increase the
possibility of resistance development in some target insects. In this regard,
Anderson argues that, in contrast to the occasional use of Bt in organic farming,
crops that are genetically engineered to contain Bt (hereinafter called 'Bt crops')
produce toxins constantly while growing, which means that insects are continu-
ally exposed to the toxins, and therefore are under constant pressure to develop
resistance. 2 9 The development of resistance to Bt toxins might engender serious
environmental problems. Bacillus thuringiensis, once considered a miracle for
agriculture, will rapidly become useless as pests become resistant to the bacteria
that are massively and continually produced by Bt crops.o Some experts have
even predicted that the development of pest resistance to Bt crops is inevitable;
the question, however, is how fast this will occur.31 The report of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1998 predicted that most target
insects could be resistant to Bt toxins within three to five years.32
According to the report of the Royal Society of Canada (RSC), the presence of
insects that are resistant to Bt toxins, politically often referred to as the
"superpests," could result in two undesirable effects. First, since Bt is the most
24. David Pimentel, Overview of the Use of Genetically Modified Organisms and Pesticides in Agriculture, 9
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 51, 57 (2001).
25. SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENr
SCIENCE, POLICY & SOCIAL IssuEs 46 (1996).
26. Id. at 46-47.
27. Sandra'S. Batie, supra note 7, at 1108.
28. Laboratory research conducted by Tabashnik has reported an increase of resistance to Bt toxin in
Lepidoptera (butterflies and moths), Coleoptera (beetles) and Diptera (mosquitoes and flies). See Bruce E.
Tabashnik, Evolution of Resistance to Bacillus Thuringiensis, 39 ANN. REV. ENTOMOLOGY 47, 49, 54 (1994).
29. LUKE ANDERSON, GENETIC ENGINEERING, FOOD, AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 28 (1999).
30. Miguel A. Altieri & Peter Rosset, Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology Will Not Ensure Food Security,
Protect the Environment and Reduce Poverty in the Developing World, 2 AGBIOFoRUM 155, 157 (1999).
31. Miguel A. Altieri & Peter Rosset, Strengthening the Case for Why Biotechnology Will Not Help the
Developing World: A Response to McGloughlin, 2 AGBIOFORuM 226, 229 (1999).
32. ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 28.
8 [Vol. 23:1
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effective biological insecticide available to organic farmers, the diminishing of
its effectiveness means that organic farming loses its control over pests, which
could seriously affect this more ecologically friendly form of agricultural
practice. Second, if conventional farmers resort to increased applications of
chemical insecticides to control populations when GM plants no longer offer
sufficient levels of protection against pest species, there is a possibility of a
serious environmental impact resulting from the use of more toxic chemicals in
agriculture."
In addition, the report of the RSC also indicates a potential impact of the insect
resistant crops on the secondary target pests, which used to be controlled by the
repeated applications of insecticides against the primary pests. The report states
that although the use of Bt crops has decreased the number of sprays used against
the target pest, it has increased problems with secondary pests which, in the
absence of the sprays against the primary pests, become more likely to develop
since they are unaffected by the toxins from the sprays against the primary
pests.
C. EFFECTS ON NON-TARGETS
Some authors also have concerns about the impact of Bt crops on non-target
herbivores and insects, such as lacewings, ladybird beetles, monarch butterfly
larvae, and soil biota." Some studies have, indeed, indicated the possibility of
those impacts. For example, a laboratory study of Losey et al. observes forty-four
percent mortality rate in monarch butterfly larvae fed on milkweed leaves dusted
with Bt corn pollen, while no mortality is observed in monarchs fed on leaves
with non-Bt corn pollen.3 Another study concerning the impact of GM crops on
non-targets is by Hilbeck et al. In this case, Hilbeck et al. observe that lacewings,
being important and beneficial insects, experienced higher mortality rates when
fed pests reared on Bt corn compared to when they were fed the pests reared on
non-Bt corn.3 The authors also detect no significant difference in mortality when
the lacewiigs were fed with different preys that were similarly fed with Bt and no
difference in mortality when the lacewings were fed with different preys that
33. The RSC concludes that this case will result in two undesirable effects: i) Bt is the most effective
biological insecticide available to organic farmers; the loss of it means the loss of control that seriously
jeopardises their livelihood and endangers an expansion of this more ecologically friendly form of agricultural
practice; ii) the possibility of a serious environmental impact if conventional farmers resorted to increased
applications of chemical insecticides to control populations when GM plants no longer offer sufficient levels of
protection against pest species. RSC, supra note 11, at 141.
34. Id.
35. Ervin et al., supra note 6, at 6.
36. John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214, 214 (1999).
37. Angelika Hilbeck et al., Effects of Transgenic Bacillus Thuringiensis Corn-Fed Prey on Mortality and
Development Time of Immature Chrysoperla Carnea (Neuroptera: Chrysopidae), 27(2) ENV'r'L ENTOMOLOGY
480, 484 (1998).
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were similarly free from Bt." Hence, the authors conclude, the difference in
mortality of lacewings is primarily due to Bt corn.39
It is worth mentioning here that the prediction of laboratory studies regarding
the effects on non-target species might be different from the situation in the
natural environment. 4 0 For example, if, in reality, non-targets are not exposed to
Bt toxins, one certainly could argue that the risk of Bt crops on non-target species
is actually low. However, a caveat given by the Ecological Society of America
(ESA) might be worth considering: "if a Bt toxin kills pest insects, it also has the
potential to kill other insects.' 4 ' This potential should be taken into account if one
considers whether the release of GMOs can only proceed with caution.
D. EFFECTS ON SOIL ECOLOGY
GM crops are also believed to have a significant impact on soil ecology. The
impact may also occur from the significant use of Bt crops. A study by Saxena et
al., for example, has observed that toxins in Bt crops persist in the soil for 234
days, allowing the toxins to keep their insecticidal characteristics and, thus,
preventing them from being degraded by soil microbes.4 2 The accumulation of
toxins, which could be released into the soil as farmers incorporate plant material
into the ground after harvest, has the potential to create serious environmental
problems in the future.
From a legal perspective, questions arise from the discussions concerning the
possible impact of GMOs in terms of what liability rules can be used for the
damage caused by GMOs and who should be held liable when that damage
occurs. These questions will be discussed in the following sections. Economic
analysis will also be provided along with the discussions related to legal liability
rules.
III. TYPES OF LIABILITY
A. THE CHOICE OF LIABILITY: EXPLORING LIABILITY FOR GMOS
The choice of liability for damage caused by GMOs has been dealt with
differently from one country to another. Some countries, such as Germany,
Austria, or Switzerland, have specific statutory provisions that establish strict
38. Id. at 484-85.
39. Id. at 485.
40. Wolfenbarger & Phifer, supra note 2, at 2089.
41. A.A. Snow et al., Genetically Engineered Organisms and the Environment: Current Status and
Recommendations, 15(2) ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONs 377, 393 (2005).
42. Deepak Saxena et al., Insecticidal Toxin in Root Exudates from Bt Corn, 402 NATURE 480, 480 (1999).
The authors, however, have conducted other research, which, as quoted in Andow & Zwahlen, observes that the
toxins can persist in the soil for at least 365 days. See Andow & Zwahlen, supra note 17, at 199.
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liability for damage caused by GMOs." Other countries might have no such
specific provisions concerning GMO liability."
Some scholars argue that a specific law on GMO liability is indeed unneces-
sary given the potential benefits, as well as the nature of GMOs. Bergkamp, for
example, argues that concerns about environmental impacts of GMOs have been
triggered by the fear of the unknown and unforeseeable risks of GMOs, which
reflects emotion rather than rational reasoning.45 From this point of view, the
author not only rejects the idea of singling out GMOs and biotechnology for a
specific liability or compensation system, but also sees no justification to treat
biotechnology as dangerous activity subject to strict liability.4 6 Whether or not a
specific liability regime should be applied for GMOs, in our opinion, depends on
the question of whether GMOs and their impacts are unique, as compared to
non-GM counterparts, so as to warrant the establishment of a specific statutory
liability. It is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the
uniqueness of GMOs and their possible impacts. However, it could be argued that
in the absence of a specific GMO liability regime, general civil liability will be
applied to GMO cases. In this regard, liability for damage caused by GMOs will
be established according to negligence rule, strict liability, or other forms of
liability rules, be it trespass or nuisance. We will in this section first explore the
possibilities of using legal rules with respect to negligence, strict liability,
trespass and nuisance to damage caused by GMOs and will in that respect
especially pay attention to the legal rules that were in practice used in case law.
Next we address the available legal rules, and more particularly, the choice
between strict liability and negligence, from an economic perspective (2) and
then turn to environmental liability (3). We then address the possibility of
applying the product liability regime to liability caused by GMOs (4), again using
the perspective of economic analysis of law. Finally, we examine to what extent
the regulatory regime with respect to GMOs and, more particularly, prior safety
regulation, will have an influence on liability (5).
43. See Vanessa Wilcox, Summaries of the Country Reports, 24 TORT AND INS. LAW, EcONOMIC Loss CAUSED
By GENETIcAllY MODIFIED ORGANISMS 19, 19, 30, 49 (Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2008) (summarizing the reports of
the application of liability and compensation schemes in several European countries).
44. From a report of Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, for example,
one may immediately see that not all countries have provisions on liability specifically directed for GMOs. The
report shows that when no such provisions exists, the issue of liability might be addressed through general civil
liability system. See: Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, "Liability and
Redress (Article 27): Compilation of Information on National, Regional, and International Measures and
Agreements in the Field of Liability and Redress for Damage Resulting from the Transboundary Movements of
Living Modified Organism", UNEP/CBD/ICCP/3/INF/l, 2 April 2002.
45. Lucas Bergkamp, Allocating Unknown Risk: Liability for Envimnmental Damages Caused by Deliber-
ately Released Genetically Modified Organisms 29 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2000),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=223068.
46. Id. at 29. Bergkamp argues that although it is unlikely for the release of GMOs undertaken in compliance
with regulations and conditions prior to authorization, activities involving GMOs conducted in an irresponsible
way could be subject to strict liability, since they may pose significant risks. See id. at 25.
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1. Negligence Rule
If genes from GM crops drift into a neighboring field and cross-pollinate with
non-GM relatives, one could expect that damage to that neighboring field will
follow. Damage might also occur when GM crops designed to contain Bt toxins
increase the development of pesticide-resistance in pests or kill non-target
insects. If such damage arises, the first type of liability that can be assigned is
negligence.
Under the negligence rule, a plaintiff injured by GMO contamination may
claim that the neighboring farmers planting GM crops, or the seed company, are
liable for the resulting damage. In this case, the plaintiff has to prove that the
defendants owe a duty of care, for example to take any precaution to prevent the
damage from occurring, and that they have breached that duty by unreasonable
conduct. In addition, the plaintiff also bears the burden of proving cause-in-fact
(causation) and the proximate cause, as well as the damage suffered.47
In the StarLink litigation,4 8 the plaintiffs argued that the defendant, i.e. Aventis,
had breached the duty of care due to its failure to comply with the regulatory
standard of care." The plaintiff also alleged that prior to the 2000 growing
season, the defendant had instructed its seed representatives that it was unneces-
sary to advise the farmers to segregate StarLink corn and to create a buffer
zone.5 0 This breach of the duty of care is alleged to have caused the damage to the
plaintiffs. This damage consisted of the widespread contamination of StarLink
corn into food products, leading to various economic losses in the corn market
47. Kershen, supra note 5, at 458.
48. The StarLink case was triggered by the finding ofBt genes, i.e., the so-called Cry9C genes, in corn-based
products for human consumption. The genes supposedly originated from Aventis's StarLink, a GM corn
specifically designated for animal feed. Due to its potential health impacts, GM crops containing the Cry9C
have been rejected for human consumption by the U.S. authority. This finding induced several corn farmers, on
behalf of nationwide corn farmers, to bring actions against Aventis, i.e. the manufacturer of StarLink corn. The
farmers alleged that the manufacturer has disseminated a product that contaminated the corn supply, increasing
farming costs and depressing corn prices. See In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828,
828-829 (N.D. Ill. 2002). For a brief introduction to this case, see Lara Khoury & Stuart Smyth, Reasonable
Foreseeability and Liability in Relation to Genetically Modified Organisms, 27 BuLL. Sci. TECH. & Soc'Y 215,
222 (2007); see also Stuart Smyth et al., Liabilities and Economics of Transgenic Crops, 20 NAruRE
BIoTEcHNoLoGY 537, 537-38 (2002).
49. Such a standard includes mandatory segregation methods to prevent StarLink from commingling with
other corn, and a "buffer zone" around StarLink corn crops to prevent cross-pollination with non-StarLink corn
plants. In addition, the EPA has required Aventis to inform farmers of the EPA's requirements for the planting,
cultivation and use of StarLink; to instruct farmers growing StarLink how to store and dispose of the StarLink
seeds, seed bags, and plant detritus; to ensure that all farmers purchasing StarLink seeds signed the Grower
Agreement, a contract binding the growers to these requirements before permitting them to grow StarLink corn;
to inform growers at the time of StarLink seed corn sales of the need to direct StarLink harvest to domestic feed
and industrial non-food uses only; to write to growers prior to planting, in order to remind them of the domestic
and industrial use requirements for StarLink corn; and to conduct a statistically sound follow up survey of
growers to monitor compliance with the Grower Agreement. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35.
50. Id. at 835.
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due to the fear of such contamination.5
2. Strict Liability
Strict liability may be used by the plaintiffs for damage resulting from GMOs.
Under strict liability, the plaintiffs do not need to prove the defendants' fault.
However, to be able to rely on strict liability, the plaintiffs still have to prove that
the damaging activity is abnormally dangerous. In order for an activity to qualify
as dangerous, scholars frequently refer to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 520 (1977), which provides several factors in determining whether an activity
is abnormally dangerous. These factors are: existence of a high degree of risk of
some harm; the likelihood that the resulting harm will be great; the inability to
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; the extent to which the
activity is not a matter of common usage; the inappropriateness of the activity to
the place where it is carried on; and the extent to which the activity's value is
outweighed by the danger it imposes.
In Hoffinan v. Monsanto,5 2 the plaintiffs resorted to strict liability, in addition
to the negligence rule, trespass, and nuisance, in seeking compensation due to the
alleged contamination, or potential contamination, from GM canola. In this case,
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were liable for having engaged in a
"non-natural use of land," and allowing "the escape of something likely to do
mischief and damage."5 3
One may argue that by using the phrase "unnatural use of land" that the
plaintiffs were actually attempting to meet one of the factors mentioned above, in
order to qualify the defendants' activity as an abnormally dangerous activity. In
this regard, the defendants' activity, namely releasing GM canola either for
testing or commercial purposes, should be proven to be an uncommon usage of
land. This was, however, not the case in Hoffinan v. Monsanto. In this case, there
was no test of whether the defendants' activity was an unnatural use of land. As a
result, the only way of determining the activity as abnormally dangerous was by
51. Id. at 833, 835.
52. Plaintiffs were organic farmers who brought a class action, on behalf of organic farmers in Saskatch-
ewan, against seed manufacturers of GM canola, i.e. Monsanto Canada Inc. and Bayer Cropscience Inc. The
plaintiffs sought damages based on the allegation that "adventitious presence" of GM canola in fields of organic
grain farmers, or potential for it, made it impossible for farmers to guarantee that canola grown as organic did
not contain traces of GM canola seed, with the result that canola could not be grown for the organic market. In
addition, the plaintiffs also argued that even if organic farmers are not growing canola, they suffer contamina-
tion of their fields due to the prevalence of Roundup Ready canola or Liberty Link canola "volunteers" growing
on their land. In this regard, the plaintiffs sued for the past and future cleanup costs resulting from
contamination. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the abandonment of an "identity preservation program" (IPP)
that had been implemented by the defendants in 1995-96 to ensure the segregation GM canola for the purposes
of export, has resulted in the loss of the European market for all Canadian canola. Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada
Inc., 2005 SKQB 225, 264 Sask. R. 1, paras. 19-21 (Can. Sask. Q.B.).
53. Id. at para. 89.
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considering the question of whether GM canola was a dangerous substance.
Apparently, the plaintiffs failed to convince the court in this matter. The.court
stated accordingly:
The point here simply is that the plaintiffs' theory, in general, does not rely
upon proving that GM canola is inherently harmful or dangerous. Indeed, any
allegation that GM canola is inherently harmful or dangerous in any respect, or
at least that any possible or potential inherently harmful quality was known to
the defendants at the time that GM canola was commercially introduced in
Canada, would seem to be inconsistent with the express pleading of the AAFC
decision documents. 54
The ruling of Hoffinan v. Monsanto above seems to confirm some of the authors'
doubt on the ability of the plaintiff to qualify the planting or release of GM crops,
for example, as an abnormally dangerous' activity. In this regard, some authors
also believe that unless used inappropriately, GMOs pose no higher risks than
their non-GM counterparts. 5 In addition, when a plaintiff is an organic farmer
and if organic farming is considered an activity with abnormally sensitive
character, the plaintiff will not succeed in establishing liability, because, accord-
ing to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 524 (1977), strict liability is not
applicable if the harm suffered by the plaintiff would not occur but for the
abnormally sensitive character of the plaintiffs activity. 1
Such difficulties in proving that planting GM crops is abnormally dangerous
will certainly be lessened if a country has statutorily determined that strict
liability is applicable for damage caused by GMOs. In this case, one may argue
that such a country has statutorily considered planting GM crops or releasing
GMOs into the environment, for example, is a dangerous activity.
3. Trespass
Liability for damage caused by GMOs may also be established according to
the law of trespass, namely an interference of one's exclusive possession of
land.5 According to de Beer, the law of trespass requires a direct and physical
interference, in the sense that it was the physical conduct of the defendant that has
directly invaded the plaintiff's property. With respect to the requirement of
physical interference, de Beer argues that genetic engineering changes not only
54. Id. at para. 23. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) has determined that GM canola "does not
present altered environmental interactions when compared to existing commercialized canola varieties in
Canada, and is considered substantially equivalent to canola currently approved as livestock feed." Id. at para.
16.
55. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Pmperty Rights and the Envirnment, 50 Am. J. COMP. L.
215, 238 (2002).
56. Kershen, supra note 5, at 457.
57. Stephanie E. Cox, Genetically Modified Organisms: Who Should Pay the Price for Pollen Drift
Contamination?, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 401, 410 (2008).
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the physical characteristics of an organism, but also the physical appearance and
structure of the DNA molecule. By referring to the doctrine of cyber trespass,
de Beer concludes that if cyber trespass is actionable, then gene trespass should
also be actionable.
With respect to the issue of directness, one may suggest that natural forces play
a significant role in the contamination by GMOs. In this respect, a question arises
as to whether planting or releasing GM crops into the environment could meet the
directness requirement. In the law of trespass, directness means that the interfer-
ence flows from the defendant's act without the intervention of other factors. In
Hoffinan v. Monsanto, Judge Smith argued that the adventitious presence of GM
crops in non-GM crops and on the organic farmers' field does not constitute a
trespass because "it is clear that much more than 'natural and inevitable forces'
must intervene between merely marketing GM canola and its arrival on the
plaintiffs' land."60 Hence, natural forces may help the defendant escape liability
for the trespassing genes. However, such an argument has been challenged by de
Beer, arguing that Judge Smith has failed to distinguish between merely market-
ing GM crops and controlling the crops until natural forces take over. De Beer
points to various rulings on trespass that have concluded that natural forces, such
as wind, do not undermine a finding on directness.6 ' Based on these rulings, the
author argues that the issue of directness in the law of trespass corresponds to the
question of whether the consequences of the defendant's act are natural and
inevitable.6 2 Following de Beer's argument, one could thus argue that so long as
the trespassing genes could be proven a natural and inevitable consequence of the
defendant's act, such as planting or releasing GM crops, then the law of trespass
is also applicable for gene contamination.
The law of trespass also requires intentional conduct by the defendant. In this
regard, intentional conduct does not necessarily mean that the defendant has
intended to create damage to the plaintiff. Rather, merely an intentional act that
directly interferes with the plaintiff's property has already constituted trespass. In
58. Jeremy de Beer, Biotrespass, 27 BULL. ScI. TEcH. & Soc'Y 287, 291 (2007).
59. Id. at 292. Other authors consider the physical interference of GM crops similar to trespass by airborne
pollutants or particulates, such as drifts from aerial spray of pesticides. See Amelia P. Nelson, Legal Liability in
the Wake of StarLink'm: Who Pays in the End?, 7 DRAKE J. AGRic. L. 241, 258 (2002); see also Grossman, supra
note 55, at 235-36. In addition, trespassing genes may also be analogous to a trespass of chattels. As a
consequence of equalizing a trespass of genes with cattle trespass, strict liability should be applied to the
trespass of genes. This is because, as concluded by Black & Wishart, cattle trespass contains several principles,
namely: 1) because of their self-willed, self-replicating nature, and the tendency to escape the control of their
owners and to create harm, living cattle require special consideration by the law; 2) those who exercise control
over and derive benefits from living cattle bear the responsibility to prevent the escape of that cattle; and 3) if the
cattle eventually escape and trespass on one's property, the keeper of the cattle should compensate the victim on
the basis of strict liability. See Katie Black & James Wishart, Containing the GMO Genie: Cattle Trespass and
the Rights and Responsibilities ofBiotechnology Owners, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 397, 415 (2008).
60. Hoffman, 2005 SKQB at para. 131.
61. Jeremy de Beer, supra note 58, at 292.
62. Id. at 294.
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this respect, de Beer argues that there is no need to consider the defendant's fault
once it is proven that the defendant intended to act in a way that interferes with
the plaintiff's property. 6 3
Another requirement in the law of trespass corresponds to the question of
whether damage should be proven to establish liability. In this regard, de Beer
observes that in the common law system, a trespass to land does not require the
proof of damage, while a trespass to chattel might require such proof.6 Accord-
ingly, de Beer suggests that if the case in question involves a spill of seeds or
plants onto the plaintiff's land, then trespass to land will be more appropriate as a
cause of action; while if the case involves the plaintiff's plants being cross-
pollinated by genes from the defendant's GM plants, trespass to chattel is more
appropriate.
4. Nuisance
Another form of liability that can be used for damage caused by GMOs is
nuisance. It may take form either as private nuisance or public nuisance. A private
nuisance is an invasion of one's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.
In this regard, a farmer suffering the contamination of GM crops may claim that
the contamination constitutes an invasion of his/her interest in the enjoyment of
land.66
A private nuisance could be brought in terms of intentional or negligent
nuisance. In an intentional nuisance, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
has not taken any action to prevent the damage. In this regard, the plaintiff has to
prove, for instance, that the defendant has failed to take any precaution to prevent
the contamination of GMOs. In a negligent nuisance, the plaintiff has to prove
that the defendant's act was unreasonable.67
Unlike private nuisance, which closely relates to the use or enjoyment of land,
public nuisance can be brought against damage to the common rights of the
general public. When public nuisance is used, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's act was unreasonable. To determine whether a defendant's conduct is
unreasonable, authors usually refer to several factors specified in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 821B, including: 68
63. Id. De Beer also argues that unlike the negligence rule, the defendant cannot escape liability by claiming
that he/she has taken a reasonable level of care to avoid the damage. In addition, unlike the law of nuisance, the
law of trespass does not require an inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant's interference with the
plaintiff's property. Id. at 290.
64. De Beer finds that with respect to a trespass to chattel, the American courts require the proof of actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff, while the British courts seem to be of the opinion that the harm is not an
element of a trespass to chattel. Canadian courts seem to be ambiguous in this matter. Id. at 289.
65. Id. at 290.
66. Cox, supra note 57, at 409.
67. Grossman, supra note 55, at 233.
68. Nelson, supra note 59, at 259.
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. Whether the conduct involves a sufficient interference with the public health,
safety, peace, comfort, or convenience;
* Whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance, or administrative
regulation
. Whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or
long-lasting impact.
Private individuals that use public nuisance must be able to establish that the
defendant's act interfered with the common rights of community and that the
damage suffered by these private individuals is different from the damage
suffered by the general public. In the StarLink litigation, the court upheld the
public nuisance claim based on two related reasons. On the one hand, the court
found that "contamination of the food supply implicates health, safety, comfort
and convenience," and hence, the plaintiffs satisfied the requirement that the
defendant's act interfered with the common rights of community.6 9 On the other
hand, the court also found that the damage suffered by the plaintiffs, i.e.
commercial corn farmers, was different from the damage suffered by the general
public.70 In this regard, the court argued that "while the general public has a right
to safe food, plaintiffs depend on the integrity of the corn supply for their
livelihood."7 1 Thus, the plaintiffs were affected differently than the general
public.
The discussions above indicate that general tort law may be a quite effective
means of addressing the issue of liability for damage caused by GMOs. However,
one may still argue that compared to other types of liability rules, strict liability is
preferable. A law and economics analysis in the following section will answer
whether this is the case.
B. ECONOMIC CRITERIA FOR STRICT LIABILITY
Economists use classic cost/benefit analysis to determine what the level of care
is that will lead to a minimization of the social costs of accidents. Not
surprisingly, this can be found where the marginal costs of care-taking equal the
marginal benefits in accident reduction. Indeed, since care-taking has its price as
well, a legal rule should not give incentives to avoid every possible accident that
could occur, but only accidents that could be avoided by investments in care, of
which the marginal costs are lower than or equal to the marginal benefits in
accident reduction. It might well be that extremely high care could additionally
contribute to a reduction in the accident risk, but the marginal costs of care-taking
in that case might be much higher than the additional benefit in accident
reduction. Investments in care would, in that case, be inefficient and scarce
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resources would be spoiled.7 2 These levels of care where marginal costs of
care-taking equal marginal benefits in accident reduction are referred to in the
literature as the optimal or efficient level of care.7 We will now first address
optimal liability rules in a unilateral case. In the unilateral accident situation we
refer to the case where only one party (referred to as the injurer or tortfeasor) can
influence the accident risk.
Before addressing which liability regime may be giving appropriate incentives
for accident reduction we should first stress that traditional economic analysis of
law points at the fact that when transaction costs are zero an optimal allocation
(e.g., following the optimal care level) would always follow, no matter what the
legal rule holds. This constitutes an application of the so-called Coase theorem.7 4
This Coase theorem is especially important in a situation where a contractual
relationship between injurer and victim exists. Hence, we will address the
importance of the Coase theorem when referring to product liability below (4).
However, when the victim is a third party (for example, a neighboring farmer
who had no contractual relationship with the manufacturer of GMOs) the Coase
theorem will not be applicable. In that case, a legal regime needs to give
incentives for care-taking and hence this distinction between the unilateral case
(where only the injurer influences the accident risk) and the bilateral case (where
both parties influence the accident risk) becomes important again.
Looking at a unilateral accident situation, one can state that two legal rules that
would give the injurer incentives for taking optimal care. If there were no liability
at all, clearly the injurer would have no incentive for care-taking; therefore in a
no-liability situation the externality will not be internalized and an inefficient
outcome will follow. If a negligence rule is adopted, the injurer will take optimal
care, provided the due care required in the legal system is equal to the optimal
care as resulting from a marginal cost/marginal benefits weighing. This can be
easily understood if the judicial system sets the due care standard correctly; the
injurer can avoid liability by taking due care. Thus, he will have to take care to
avoid the accident, but if he does so, he can avoid paying the expected damage.
Of course, the injurer could take more care than the legal system requires him to
do under a negligence rule, but he will have no incentive to do so since he can
already escape liability by following the due care standard. The injurer could also
spend less on care than the legal system requires him to. In that case he will have
lower costs of care-taking, but he will have to pay damages in case an accident
72. This finding only holds in a risk neutral setting. In case of risk aversion higher investments in care might
well be efficient since a reduction of accident risk will in that case also remove the disutility of risk from a
risk-averse person.
73. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV.
851, 870 (1981); see also A. MrrCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND EcONOMIcs 7 (1983).
74. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
75. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 21 (1980); Guido Calabresi,
Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 658 (1975).
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occurs. Since the optimal care standard was defined as exactly that level of care
where the marginal costs of care equal the marginal benefits in accident
reduction, taking less than the due care standard will not be efficient for the
individual injurer since it will increase his total expected costs. Thus, a negli-
gence rule will lead to an efficient outcome as long as the legal system defines
due care as equal to the optimal care of the model.
Also, a strict liability rule will lead to the optimum in a case where only one
party can influence the accident risk. The reason is quite straightforward. A strict
liability rule basically states that the injurer has to compensate in any case no
matter the level of care he took. It is sometimes argued that this will lead the
injurer to take excessive precautions or to take no care at all since he is liable
anyway. Neither of these statements seems true. By making the injurer strictly
liable, the social decision is in fact shifted to the injurer. In a unilateral accident
case it simply means that he has to bear all the social costs of accidents, i.e. his
own costs of care-taking and the expected damage. Therefore, he will take
exactly the same decision, i.e. to minimize his total expected accident costs. This
can be reached at the optimal care level. Therefore, the injurer will take optimal
care since this is the way to minimize his total expected costs. Spending more on
care would increase his costs of care-taking inefficiently and spending less on
care would increase the expected damage inefficiently.
In addition, strict liability is more preferable than the negligence rule when one
takes into account the activity level. Under the negligence rule, the injurer will
escape liability as long as he takes the optimal level of care. As a result, so long as
the injurer maintains the optimal level of care, he does not have to take into
account the optimal level of his activity. This means that from society's point of
view, a number of activities might be excessively inefficient. The situation will be
different under strict liability. Since the injurer will be liable whenever the
accident occurs, the injurer will pay adequate attention not only to the optimal
level of precaution, but also to the optimal level of activity.78
Theoretically, the risk of an accident taking place depends not only on the level
of precaution, but also on the number of activities.79 Hence, since strict liability
will induce the injurer to take into account both optimal precaution and activity
level, we could argue that strict liability is superior to the negligence rule.
76. For a recent discussion of the economics of strict liability versus negligence, see Hans-Bemd Schglfer &
Frank Milller-Langer, Efficient Liability Rules, in Toler LAW AND EcONoMics 3 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
77. POLINSKY, supra note 73, at 39; Shavell, supra note 75, at 11.
78. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 6960, 1999).
79. Faure & Skogh have given an example about the risk of having a traffic accident, which depends not only
on the care that the driver takes, but also on the number of kilometres driven in a certain period of time. Here, the
authors also conclude that in terms of providing incentives to take optimal activity levels, only strict liability
will be efficient. See MICHAEL FAuRE & GoRAN SKOGH, THE EcONoMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVmoIRNENTAL PoLICY
AND LAW: AN INTRODuCTION 252-53 (2003).
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How does one, in sum, apply the economic arguments in favor of strict liability
to the case of damage caused by GMOs?
The first question to be answered is whether the handling of GMOs should be
considered as a unilateral accident, being an accident where only the injurer can
influence the accident risk. If that were the case, we concluded that the economic
model predicts that the advantage of the strict liability rule is that it will provide
the injurer optimal incentives for care.so If in this particular case, the victim
cannot influence the accident risk, strict liability would be the first and best
solution, by providing the operator of the GMO optimal incentives to reduce the
risk that GMO crops would cause damage to third parties.
The question, however, arises whether damage caused to a third party8 by
GMO crops is always a truly unilateral accident. Depending upon the factual
circumstances (which can of course significantly vary) some may argue that one
could imagine circumstances where potential victims could also take measures to
prevent the damage. If that would be the case, one could argue that GMO damage
becomes a bilateral risk in which the potential victim could also take efficient
measures to prevent the risk. However, one could still argue that the influence of
the operator of the GMO is probably still far more important than the influence of
the victim. If that is the case, the outcome does not change and the strict liability
rule remains warranted to give the operator of the GMO optimal incentives to
take preventive measures. This clearly assumes that the operator who handles the
GMO is in the best position to prevent the risk. However, as will be mentioned
below, in this bilateral case, it remains important that a defense should be added
to the strict liability rule to give victims incentives for prevention as well.
However, if it would appear from the factual situation that it is as important to
provide victims with incentives to prevent the risk, as it is to give similar
incentives -to the operator who handles the GMO, a negligence rule would be
optimal.
Hence, GMO damage does not seem to be comparable with a classic environ-
mental case. In the latter case, it is often argued that these are typical unilateral
cases, where most of the influence of the accident risk comes from the potential
polluter. Therefore, most argue in favor of a clear strict liability rule since the
victim can usually do less than the potential polluter to avoid the risk. However,
since potential victims in the GMO case may be professionals as well, the same
line of reasoning does not apply. If in fact it appears that the influence of both the
potential victim and the operator who handles the GMOs is equally important, a
negligence rule might in fact be optimal.8 2
80. Also, it would provide optimal incentives to take an efficient activity level. See Shavell, supra note 75, at
1 (on the importance of the activity level).
81. Remember that with a third party we refer to the victim not standing in a contractual relationship with the
injurer (GMO producer), since in that case the Coase theorem may be applicable.
82. The economic reason is that only negligence also provides incentives to the victim to adopt an optimal
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From the explanation above, it appears that whether GMO liability cases are of
a unilateral or a bilateral nature depends upon the factual situation. One could
certainly argue that cross-pollination from GM crops to non-GM crops consti-
tutes a unilateral case. This is because if organic or conventional farmers should
also prevent the cross-pollination, they should change their usual practices and,
hence, incur high costs.83 Under this situation, following the, Coase theorem we
presented above, if transaction costs between organic farmers and farmers
planting GM crops are low, they may bargain to determine who is in a better
position (i.e. has the ability to more cheaply negotiate) to prevent the pollination.
However, if transaction costs are high, a liability rule more suitable for the
unilateral case should apply. In this regard, strict liability may be better than a
negligence rule.84 Transaction costs will certainly be high in the situation where,
for example, damage does not consist of admixtures but of damage to a third
party not in agriculture at all.
Moreover, another argument in favor of strict liability is related to the fact that
the negligence rule works efficiently only if the judge is able to set the due care
standard required in the legal system efficiently. However, in reality this may
require very high information costs and judges iay have difficulties adequately
balancing the marginal costs of taking additional preventive measures versus the
marginal benefits in further reducing the accident risk. The advantage of strict
liability is that in that particular case, all information costs are shifted to the
injurer. Under strict liability it is indeed the injurer who balances costs and
benefits of prevention costs versus the potential damage. Hence, in cases where
one would assume that injurers are better able than judges to adequately perform
the cost-benefit analysis required to set the due care level this would be yet
another important argument in favor of strict liability. Of course the latter
argument may once more provide a strong case for strict liability when damage
results from the use of GMOs. Indeed, for the judge to efficiently set a due care
standard, high information costs would be involved. Given the highly technical
nature of the risk, it may be impossible for the judiciary to set care standards
adequately.85 Under strict liability, it is the producer of GMO who will balance
activity level.
83. One commentator notes that if organic or conventional farmers are forced to prevent gene contamination,
they may have to abandon their seed-saving practices and, given resistance of the hybrids, use more toxic
herbicides. Preston, supra note 14, at 1159.
84. Another reason for applying strict liability is the nonreciprocal nature of damage possibly suffered by the
organic or conventional farmers. In this case, a farmer who plants GM crops gains benefits from his crops, while
at the same time exposing his neighbor to a risk to which he is not subjected, e.g. the risk of losing organic
certification. See A. Bryan Endres, "GMO:" Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation?
The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Union, 22 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 453, 491 (2000). A rationale behind this argument is probably related to the issue of the
distribution of risk and benefit, in which those who gain benefits, while at the same time subjecting others to
risks, should pay the damages if those risks materialize.
85. One has to balance this somewhat because the judge is of course aided in this process of weighing costs
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cost and benefits and will subsequently choose the efficient care level. If
producers are better informed than the judiciary on the optimal care necessary to
reduce the risk (which is very likely in the case of GMO risks) this constitutes yet
another argument in favor of strict liability.
Above we indicated that a second advantage of strict liability is that it will also
provide incentives to adopt a correct activity level. This might also mean that the
application of strict liability to GMO cases will reduce the number of activities
involving GMOs. Whether or not this is a desirable result will depend largely on
the benefits of GMOs relative to possible costs resulting from the commercial
release of GMOs.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
If one now turns away from the more traditional tort case (where a third party
victim suffers loss resulting from the GMO) and assumes that damage is caused
to the environment as such, the question arises how that affects the choice
between strict liability and negligence. An important difference between the
classic tort case and the case where GMOs cause damage to the environment as
such, is that environmental harm usually makes the accident situation unilateral.
There is indeed very little that the environment as such could do to prevent the
accident. As we mentioned above, it is argued in economic literature that in a
unilateral accident model (where only the behavior of the injurer influences the
accident risk) strict liability will be efficient since it induces the injurer to adopt
an efficient activity level and optimal care. Therefore, it has been argued that
there seems to be an economic rationale behind the tendency in case law and in
many environmental statutes in legal systems to introduce strict liability for
environmental damage; since the victim cannot influence the accident risk, strict
liability will be the best solution to give the potential polluter optimal incentives
for accident reduction.16 A few important nuances have been formulated in the
literature in this respect: strict liability (for environmental harm) assumes that the
judge has accurate information on the amount of the damage. If courts err in
assessing damages, strict liability, as Cooter showed, will lead to under-
deterrence. Strict liability is also only efficient if the injurer is always held to
fully pay for the consequences of the accident. If the injurer were insolvent or if
the judge were to underestimate the amount of the damage, a negligence rule
would be preferred. This is the case, provided that the judge could at least
and benefits by the regulator. To some extent, the regulator took over this process and set efficient regulatory
standards on which the judge can rely in a negligence case. For further details see Michael Faure, Economic
Analysis of Tort and Regulatory Law, in ToRT AND REGULATORY LAw 399 (Willem H. van Boom, Meinhard
Lukas & Christa Kissling, eds., 2007).
86. For a detailed analysis see the contributions in DETERRENCE, INSURABiLITY, AND COMPENSATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILrrY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Michael Faure ed., 2003).
87. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1540 (1984).
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adequately fix the optimal level of care, even if there was uncertainty concerning
the precise amount of the damage. 8 This, therefore, leads to a balanced
conclusion as far as the optimal liability rule is concerned for environmental
damage caused by GMOs; given the unilateral nature of the damage, strict
liability may have a preference. This, however, only holds if the injurers are not
insolvent and if the courts can assess the damage correctly. Also, Trebilcock
pointed at the fact that (in environmental, but also in other liability areas) strict
liability may have undesirable effects if it is combined with other features such as
shifting the burden of proof, joint and several liability and high (punitive)
damages for (non-pecuniary) losses. 8 9 The reason why strict liability regimes in
the U.S., like CERCLA, also referred to as Superfund, are regarded as "crushing"
is not so much because of the strict liability itself, but because of the combination
of joint and several liability together with the retrospective nature in the case of
Superfund liability.90 Therefore the final judgment on the efficiency of strict
liability for environmental harm may depend upon these other issues such as
causation and the magnitude of damages awarded. 9' Interestingly, recent empiri-
cal evidence has shown that environmental liability regimes do indeed have a
positive influence on the incentives of potential polluters to take additional
preventive measures.9 2
D. PRODUCT LIABILITY
In addition to the liability rules discussed in the previous section, product
liability may also be used by the victims who suffer damage from the release or
planting of GMOs. In fact, as one author predicts, product liability is among the
most likely biotechnology causes of action, ranging from claims for allergenicity,
toxicity, contamination and other damages.93
In order to succeed in a product liability claim, the plaintiff must be able to
establish several elements, namely that the defendant has sold and been engaged
in the selling of the damaging product, that the product was defective, that the
defect was unreasonably dangerous, that the product reached the user without
substantial change, and that the product was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
88. Id. at 1542.
89. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort
Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929, 929-30 (1987).
90. See James Boyd, A Market-Based Analysis of Financial Insurance Issues Associated with U.S. Natural
Resource Damage Liability, in DETERRENCE, INSURABILTY, AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILrrY:
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 258 (Michael Faure ed., 2003).
91. See generally Trebilcock, supra note 89.
92. For a discussion of this literature see Michael Faure, Environmental Liability, in ToRT LAW AND
EcONOMics 247, 252-253 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
93. Gregory N. Mandel, The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication, 23 PACE ENvrL. L. REV.
83, 95 (2006).
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injury.94 In our opinion, from those five elements, the mhost important element
that must be established is that the product was defective. For the GMO case, this
means that a GM product was defective, either in terms of a manufacturing defect
or a design defect. A manufacturing defect occurs when a particular unit of
product deviates from other units in such a way that imposes harm to the user.
Unlike a manufacturing defect, a design defect occurs when a specific product
unit fits its intended design, but the design itself causes the product to be unsafe.
In addition to manufacturing and design defects, a defect could also be indicated
by the failure to warn or to provide adequate warning. A producer of a dangerous
product, when he/she knows or should have known the risks of his/her product,
bears the responsibility to give adequate directions or warning to prevent such
risks from occurring. A failure to warn or an inadequate warning gives rise to the
producer's liability.9 5
Compared to the manufacturing defect, the design defect and inadequate
warning are more likely to indicate the defect of GMOs. With respect to the
design defect, Moltalbano argues that the very nature of a GM plant, in this case
GM bentgrass designed to have resistance to herbicides, has the potential to
create impacts, such as cross-hybridization with non-GM grass, which make the
GM grass unreasonably dangerous, and hence, indicate a design defect.9 6 Of
course, one may also argue that many potential impacts do not result from the
GM plant design, but from the segregation practices and inappropriate use of the
GM plant.97 In our opinion, the fact that GM crops require approval from state
agencies implies that the potential harmful impacts of the currently marketed
GMOs do not necessarily mean that the products contain a design defect.
Regulatory agencies consider such harmful impacts as normal, and therefore,
capable of being averted with various preventive measures and adequate instruc-
tions. Consequently, a defect might be established only when the producers fail to
provide adequate instructions, directions, or warning of the potential impacts.
Another important issue in products liability corresponds to the question of
whether a third party, being harmed by the product, can sue the producer on the
grounds of product liability. This is.apparent in the StarLink litigation, which in
essence is product liability litigation. In that case, claims on the negligence rule,
strict liability, trespass, and nuisance stemmed from an allegedly defective
product of StarLink corn. However, each of the plaintiffs was an organic farmer
who did not purchase or use the defendant's product. In addition, one of those
plaintiffs also claimed under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) that
94. Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of Genetically Modified Organisms,
43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 625-26 (2004).
95. Brady L. Montalbano, It's Not Easy Being Green-Holding Manufacturers of Genetically Modified
Bentgrass Liable Under Strict Products Liability, 14 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 111, 122-23 (2005).
96. Id. at 123.
97. In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 837 (N.D. 111. 2002).
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the defendant was involved in a deceptive trade practice." The defendant
rejected the claim by arguing that the plaintiff had no consumer transaction with
the defendant.99 The court upheld the plaintiff's claim by arguing that the TCPA
allows the third parties to bring a claim if they are harmed by the deceptive trade
practices of the defendant.oo
From the discussions above, it appears that product liability is a viable cause of
action in the case of damage caused by GMOs. Consequently, the issue of
product liability for damage caused by GMOs also merits a law and economics
analysis. Product liability could be first analyzed from an economic perspective;
it is a case whereby damage is caused to a party standing in a contractual
relationship with the injurer, in this case the one producing, manufacturing, or
delivering the GMOs. In that particular case of product liability it is important to
look at the contractual situation. Subsequently, the fact that a particular product
(that by hypothesis has used GMOs) has first been delivered to a purchaser has
important consequences for the structure of the liability 'rule, even if damage
would not be caused to the purchaser but to third parties. Economic analysis
carefully distinguishes the various hypotheses that can be recognized in this
respect.
1. Contractual Liability Based on the Coase Theorem
In the economic analysis of law, the Coase theorem plays an important role for
analyzing efficient product liability rules. Applying the Coase theorem in a
product liability setting means that if a purchaser of a product is fully informed of
the possible defects and the product risk, he will always take into account the
expected damage and add this to the market price to decide whether or not to
purchase the product. The well-informed consumer will always take into account
the full price of the product, which includes the expected damage.' In that case,
the agreement on the distribution of risk might be reflected in the contract price.
The price mechanism can have this signaling function to the consumer. If the
market price reflects the expected damage, the consumer can know that the
producer bears the accident risk. If, however, the market price only reflects the
cost price of the product and not the expected damage the well-informed
consumer would know that he bears the accident risk himself.10 2
98. Id. at 851.
99. Id. at 851.
100. Id. at 852.
101. Walter Y. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL J. EcON. & MoMT. Sel. 3, 5 (1973); Michael
Adams, Produkthaftung-WohltatoderPlage: Eine okonomischeAnalyse, 30 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1, 5 (1987); see
Francesco Silva & Alberto Cavaliere, The Economic Impact of Product Liability: Lessons from the US and the
EU Experience, in REGULATORY REFORM AND COMPETITIVENESS IN EUROPE: HORIZONTAL IssuEs 292, 295
(Giampaolo Galli ed., 2000).
102. For simple examples, see STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONoMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 78-80 (1987);
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In this situation where the consumer is fully informed of the accident risk, the
optimal care and optimal production (activity) level will automatically be
followed, irrespective of the legal rule. This result holds, both under strict
liability, as well as under negligence, even in a no-liability setting. Indeed, the
fully informed consumer will, as is demonstrated, only purchase the product
taking into account its full price. In a no-liability setting, the consumer will add
the expected loss to the (low) market price and still demand the product with the
lowest full price. Applying the Coase theorem to the product liability case entails
that an efficient result follows, no matter which legal regime applies. But this
result depends upon the heavy assumption of full information of the consumer.
One has to understand that on paper this works perfectly, but the theories
applying the Coase theorem to product liability rely on a very.heavy assumption:
full information of the risk caused by the GMO products. It is particularly this
assumption of full information that has been subject to serious criticism. This can
also be understood, particularly in the case of GMOs. However, one should make
a distinction between the type of consumer that purchases the GMO related
products. A distinction between commercial and non-commercial purchases may
be indicated in this respect. Commercial purchasers, aware that they purchase
GMOs products, may be well aware of the risk. In that respect, applying the
Coase theorem is therefore not that strange. The story however changes in the
case of ordinary consumers who have no information whatsoever with respect to
the risk related to the GMO use. Generally it has been held that one solution to the
lack of consumer information is to provide additional information on the risks
through legislative measures. If these were successful the conditions for the
Coase theorem could again be met. However, sometimes information may not
help in providing better insights to the consumer. Recently, behavioral law and
economics has also pointed at the fact that consumers' choices are often subject to
a variety of so-called heuristics and biases. As a result, the ability of consumers to
adapt their behavior (even if information is provided) may be limited.10 3 These
biases may also play a role in case of decisions made by consumers concerning
the purchase of particular products. Hence, the possibility of curing heuristics
and biases by providing additional information may be limited.
Then the question arises how liability law should react to this underestimation
of the risk by consumers. It is generally held that if the consumer remains
uninformed, non-liability will certainly not lead to an efficient result. The reason
is that producers will in that case not have efficient incentives to invest in
prevention of damage caused by GMOs. This is particularly the case if the benefit
POLINSKY, supra note 73, at 96-97; see also Silva & Cavaliere, supra note 101, at 295.
103. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998) (for an excellent summary of behavioural law and economics); see
also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALm L. REv. 1051, 1055 (2000).
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of the investment (reduction of expected accident cost) is not recognized by the
consumer.o10
2. A Case for Strict Liability
It is generally held that in such cases fault-rule can induce the producer to take
efficient care, but only a strict liability rule will lead to an optimal output of
products. In this respect strict liability is considered to be a good remedy for
underestimation of the risk by consumers. 05
The latter conclusion is also true when harm is caused to third parties, e.g.,
bystanders, who have no connection at all with the producer. A Coasean solution
is of course excluded under these circumstances since the transaction costs will
be prohibitive. There is also no "contact" between a producer and third parties
through the price mechanism. 0 6 Again, a fault rule would induce the producer to
take efficient care, but consumers would purchase too many products. Therefore,
the market price would be too low, since it would not reflect the expected
accident costs and, given this demand, an excessive output of products will
follow.' 0 7 This inefficiency can, again, only be remedied by the introduction of a
strict liability rule. Since, under such a rule the market price will reflect the
expected accident costs, both efficient care will be taken by the producer and an
efficient quantity will be produced.10 8
Up to this point we have shown that the economic theory does not jump to
hasty general conclusions with respect to the desirability of a fault or a strict
liability rule. Such an answer depends on whether the victim is a consumer or a
third party and if it is a consumer a further distinction is made depending on
whether or not the consumer underestimates the risk of a product-accident.
However, if consumers do underestimate the risk, or if the harm is caused to third
parties, the literature clearly points to the advantages of strict liability from an
efficiency viewpoint. These are mostly referred to as the full internalization of
the harm through the strict liability rule. However, the economic theory does not
stop here. We have assumed-until now-that the behavior of the victim had no
influence on the accident risk, that both producers and consumers were risk-
neutral and that the market was perfectly competitive. Other publications have
104. This is especially stressed by Goldberg in a critique on the work by Oi. See Victor P. Goldberg, The
Economics of Product Safety and Imperfect Information, 5 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 683, 683 (1974). For a
reaction see Walter Y Oi, The Economics of Product Safety: a Rejoinder, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 689
(1974).
105. See Adams, supra note 101, at 12; POLINSKY, supra note 73, at 99; Shavell, supra note 75, at 14-17
(providing formal proof of the proposition); see also Silva & Cavaliere, supra note 101, at 295.
106. See Koichi Hamada, Liability Rules and Income Distribution in Product Liability, 66 Am. EcoN. REV.
228, 230 (1976); Cento G. Veljanovski, The Economic Theory of Tort Liability-Toward a Corrective Justice
Approach, in THE EcoNoMic APPROACH To LAW 125, 130-31 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981).
107. See POLINSKY, supra note 73, at 103; Shavell, supra note 102, at 49-50.
108. Shavell, supra note 75, at 3.
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shown that when these assumptions are relaxed, the advantage of strict liability,
as expressed earlier, does not prevail.
It has been stressed that in a bilateral accident situation where the victim also
influences the accident risk, liability rules should also give the victims an
incentive to take appropriate care and not to engage too often in dangerous
activities. If the victim has an important influence on the accident risk most
authors hold that a fault rule will be preferred to a strict liability rule, even if the
latter is combined with a contributory riegligence defense. One of the reasons
given is the unwillingness of courts to consider the contributory negligence of
victims, which might easily affect their incentives. In addition, only a fault rule
will lead to an efficient activity level by the victim. It is therefore held that if the
victim has an important influence on the accident risk and it is thus more
important to control his activity level than it is to control the injurer's, a fault rule
will be preferred. 0
In sum, the economic theory advances strong arguments in favor of a strict
liability rule when consumers underestimate the risk of a product accident or
when the harm is caused to third parties. However, if the victim has a substantial
influence on the accident risk, or if the producer has market power and the
consumers underestimate the accident risk, or if one takes into account the
influence of insurance, strong arguments could be advanced in favor of a fault
rule. Again, just as we stressed as far as the general choice between strict liability
and negligence is concerned, it all depends on whether one considers the GMO
risk as a unilateral or bilateral accident case. That choice may well depend on the
type of victim; in the case of commercial users, accidents may have a bilateral
nature since the victim should also be given incentives to reduce the accident risk.
However, if the victim is a consumer without specialized information, the
measures the victim could take to reduce the risk may be very limited. That
would make the accident a unilateral type accident where strict liability may be
preferable.
Notwithstanding these theoretical observations on the nature of product
liability, product liability may in legal practice only come into play if indeed
consumers would suffer harm as a result of a genetically modified product.
However, as we showed above, most of the liability cases with respect to GMOs
so far were brought by organic farmers suffering harm as a result of GMOs used
by their neighbors. At first blush it could be argued that this is not a product
liability case because the relationship between a producer (of GMOs) and the
damage (to the third party, organic farmers) is too remote, and because it is not
the final product that causes the harm to the neighbor, rather a production method.
Still, the StarLink litigation, discussed above, showed that third parties were
109. Id. at 7, 20; Shavell, supra note 102, at 48-51 (this will often be dependent upon the nature of the
activity and the potential harm).
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allowed to bring a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.'o
Hence, the applicability of product liability rules in this case cannot completely
be ruled out either.
E. INFLUENCE OF REGULATION
So far, we have presented liability rules from an economic perspective -as
instruments to providing incentives to prevent damage caused by GMOs. In
reality, of course, GMOs are subject to a great deal of safety regulation. The goal
of this safety regulation is precisely the prevention of damage. Thus, a much
more important role will be played, in practice, by safety regulation than by
liability rules, at least as far as prevention is concerned. This, by the way, also
corresponds with the economic criteria for safety regulation as they have inter
alia been developed by Shavell.'" Indeed, information on the optimal ways to
prevent damage caused by the use of GMOs is probably more readily available to
a regulator than with the potentially liable operator. Thus, the informational
advantage is the first important criterion in favor of safety regulation. Second,
there may be a serious insolvency risk. The insolvency risk arises from the
moment that the damage that could result from the use of the GMO would be
higher than the assets of the person liable for that particular use. The damage can
be catastrophically high, especially if one imagines damage along the food chain
with far-reaching consequences to many consumers, or at least leading to large
economic losses. There is always the likelihood that operators are organized as
legal entities. Legal entities generally enjoy limitation of liability and thus there
is always the danger that they will externalize harm to third parties.11 2 Third,
there may be a risk that there is a long time lapse between the moment that the
source of GMO damage takes place and the moment that the damage occurs. In
addition, there may be difficulties for the victim to prove a causal relationship
between his damage and the acts of a particular operator. These latency and
causation problems may lead to situations whereby tort law is not used, even
though the conditions for liability are fulfilled. Thus, when the threat of a liability
suit will not provide a sufficient deterrent effect, this provides another argument
in favor of regulation.
Although Shavell's criteria thus provide a strong argument to control GMO
risks ex ante through regulation, in individual cases there can still be damage.
Then again, liability under tort comes into the picture and the question of course
110. In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851-52 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
111. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 369-370
(1984).
112. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Towards Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879-81 (1991). Because of this danger of using the corporate structure for
externalizing harm to involuntary creditors, Hansmann & Kraakman argued in favor of unlimited shareholder
liability for corporate torts.
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arises of how regulation influences the liability system and vice versa.
The first question that arises is whether violation of a regulatory standard
concerning GMOs should automatically be considered a fault under tort law and
thus lead to liability. Most legal systems consider a breach of a regulatory duty
evidence of negligence per se.1 3 One of the reasons for introducing safety
regulations to control GMO risks is, as mentioned above, that the regulator will
usually possess better information to evaluate the efficient standard of care than
the parties involved. Hence, regulation passes on information to the parties on the
efficient standard of care, but does so equally to the judge. The judge may lack
the necessary information to find out what the particular standard is that could be
required from the person handling the GMO. Therefore, the statutory standard
can guide the judge in a liability case.
A more difficult question may arise as to whether compliance with a regulatory
standard could release an injurer from liability. Bergkamp, for example, argues
that where risk assessment and monitoring have found no significant risk could
arise from the release of GMOs and so long as the release is conducted in
accordance with regulations and conditions, no liability for unknown risks is
likely to be imposed. 1 14 In this case, an injurer may argue that the damage is in
fact unforeseeable."' However, as Smyth and others have put it, although
regulatory standards have been followed, many species could still roam and
cross-pollinate to their wild relatives, which potentially would create environmen-
tal problems.1 6 This means that a regulatory standard does not necessarily
remove the risks of damage, since some species may roam beyond the buffer
zone and pollinate with other plants and potentially cause damage as well. The
question will be whether the impacts of such pollination are significant. In this
case, the injurer may still be found liable although he has complied with the
regulatory standards.11 7
Consequently, although the noncompliance with a regulatory standard is a
sufficient reason for injurer's liability, the reverse is not true; regulation should
113. E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation: An
Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 384 (2002).
114. Bergkamp, supra note 45, at 21.
115. In this regard, Rodgers argues that when risk assessment prior to a commercial release of GMOs found
only negligible risk, it will be difficult for the defendants to establish that the resulting damage was indeed
foreseeable before the release. Christopher P. Rodgers, Liability for the Release of GMOs into the Environment:
Exploring the Boundaries of Nuisance, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 371, 390,400 (2003).
116. Smyth et al., supra note 48, at 537-38. As quoted by Endres, a study conducted in the U.K. found pollen
from GM crops had been carried by bees 4.5 kilometres away from the test field. See Endres, supra note 84, at
456.
117. Khoury & Smyth argue that although a risk assessment prior to an authorization of GM crops revealed
the remoteness of risks, these risks could still be considered foreseeable based on public concerns. This is
because, as the authors argue, the absence of knowledge does not mean the absence of public concern about
possible risks. As a result, the injurer will still be held liable if these risks materialize in the future. To support
this argument, the author resorts to the precautionary principle, by which the injurer is liable when the uncertain
risks of serious magnitude materialize in the future. Khoury & Smyth, supra note 48, at 226-28.
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not, from an economic perspective, necessarily free the GMO operator from
liability. The reason to reject this so-called regulatory compliance defense from
an economic perspective is that the regulatory standard is in some cases merely a
minimum."' The efficient standard can be higher and thus liability should
supplement regulation in this case to provide the GMO operator incentives to
take efficient care to prevent the damage."' Exposure to liability does provide
the GMO operator with incentives to take all efficient precautions, even if this
requires more than merely following the regulation. Moreover, liability is an
important remedy for the unavoidable capturing of administrative agencies,
which may lead to inefficiently low regulatory standards. Exposing the GMO
operator to liability even though the operator followed regulations or the
conditions of a license is thus, from an economic perspective, an important tool to
guarantee that the operator will take efficient care.
In addition, the discussion of the regulatory standard should also include how
the release of GMOs would be overseen. In such a case, it is not unusual that the
oversight of the release is left to the seed company.' 20 Clapp argues that the
tendency to apply lenient compliance monitoring, in which the compliance with
regulatory standards depends largely on the self-reporting and self-monitoring
conducted by the seed companies, has contributed to some cases of illegal release
of GMOs in the United States.12' This point confirms that following a lenient
118. Some countries may not have only minimum, but also sub-optimal regulatory standards for GMOs. See,
e.g., the critics of Bratspies concerning the US regulation on the commercialization of Bt crops. She argues that
the agencies responsible for the release of Bt crops have abandoned the precautionary principle, and instead
used the most optimistic estimates as the basis of their decision. In addition, there is no clear mechanism to
ensure the growers' compliance with the requirement set by the seed companies, as it could be assumed that it is
not in the companies' interest to enforce their requirement. See Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care:
Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENvrtL. L.J. 297, 346 (2002).
Assuming that this allegation is true, releasing an injurer just because he has followed such a non-optimal
regulatory standard, may create too many harms for society, in which case the price of GM products would not
represent the true social costs.
119. Cf. Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 19 INT'L
REv. L. & EcoN. 227, 237 (1999).
120. The commercial release of GMOs by individual farmers is usually based on contractual agreements, by
which the seed company specifies certain procedures in planting its GM seed. For example, the company
usually requires the GM growers to meet the permissible use of the GM seed and prohibits the seed saving or
seed transfer to third parties. Based on these agreements, the company will then monitor the farmers'
compliance with the agreements. See, de Beer, supra note 58, at 293.
121. Clapp found that in three cases of illegal release of GMOs, i.e. the StarLink case (GM corn for animal
feed is found in food supply), the BtlO maize case (unapproved GM maize was found in the seed and food
supplies), and the Liberty Link RICE 601 case (unapproved GM rice was found in rice supplies), the seed
companies failed to detect the illegal release and inform the authority about the release, since iri all three cases
the illegal release was initially detected by other parties. In addition, Clapp also found that rather than
improving their monitoring systems, the companies either blamed the farmers for the illegal release or asked the
regulatory agency to issue a retroactive approval for the previously unapproved seeds. Accordingly, Clapp
concludes that heavy reliance on voluntary corporate measures, such as self-monitoring and self-reporting, has
failed to induce compliance with the regulatory standards. Jennifer Clapp, Illegal GMO Releases and Corporate
Responsibility: Questioning the Effectiveness of Voluntary Measures, 66 ECOLOGICAL EcoN. 348, 352-355
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regulatory standard should not be a defense, since such a standard will certainly
fail to induce potential injurers to take the optimal preventive measures.
IV. CAUSATION
A. GENERAL
Problems can of course arise as far as the requirement that a causal link be
established between the alleged damage and the presence of the particular GMO
concerned. The economic analysis of law has paid considerable attention to the
requirements that should in general be attached to causation. It would lead us too
far afield to discuss these in any detail at this moment.'22 Shavell explains in clear
words that there is a good economic reason to limit the liability of an injurer to
the cases he has really caused.12 3 If the requirement of a causal link would not
have this limiting effect on liability, the result would be that many potentially
beneficial activities in society would no longer take place because in effect an
operator would then also be held liable for damage that would not result from his
acts.12 4 A liability for damage that is not the result of the activity of the operator
would thus be considered as crushing, as Shavell holds.125 Thus, it makes good
sense to limit the liability of the operator who handled GMOs to the damage
actually caused by the GM crop. 1 26
B. BURDEN OF PROOF
Where there is uncertainty over causation, an early question that arises is on
whom the burden of proof should rest in a case. Uncertainty can arise, for
instance, when there may be many different sources and it is not clear what
precisely caused the damage to a non-GM crop. Also, there may be multiple
causes. Regarding all of these issues of causal uncertainty, there is both a
procedural aspect (who should bear the burden of proof?) and a contents aspect
(how should the law deal with uncertainty over causation?).
Traditionally, the plaintiff, i.e., the victim, should bear the burden of proof
regarding the elements of the liability rule that he uses to claim damages.1 27 He
(2008).
122. See generally Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69 (1975); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law
of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL SruD. 463 (1980); Landes & Posner, supra note 73, at 851.
123. Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & EcON.
587, 588 (1985).
124. Id.
125. See Shavell, supra note 102, at 108.
126. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in Toler LAW AND EcONOMICs 83
(Michael Faure ed., 2009).
127. In the absence of a specific liability system for GMOs, the victim should resort to one of several liability
rules, namely trespass, private nuisance, negligence, strict liability, or product liability. Each of these rules has
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should, for example, prove that he has suffered damage and that this damage was
the result of exposure to a GM crop. Almost inevitably, the victim will need to
rely on expert opinion to support his claim.128
However, one may argue that the court may place the burden of proof on those
who can acquire information more cheaply. In this regard, shifting the burden of
proof to the GM operators could be justified for several reasons. First, the shifting
of the burden of proof may release the victims from the difficult task of proving
their claims. Second, it could also be argued that GM operators have control over
GMOs, and thus they are in a better position to control any resulting damage from
GMOs, and to acquire information regarding the impacts of GMOs. Third, as
Clapp has argued, in cases when uncertainty is prevalent, such as in the
development and release of GMOs, there is information asymmetry in favor of
GMO operators. 129 In this case, the reversal of the burden of proof may function
as a counter against information asymmetry. "0
Based on such an efficiency argument, the more important question will no
longer be about the burden of proof, but about the standard of proof. The issue of
standard of proof is particularly important if we are faced with uncertainty
concerning causality.
C. CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY
There is a real likelihood that, as we just mentioned above, many issues of
causal uncertainty could arise in cases in which non-GM crops cause damage to
third parties. Uncertainty could, for example, arise concerning the question of
whether GM crops have caused the damage. In that case, the causal uncertainty
relates to the source of the damage. In other (or the same) cases, there could be
uncertainty concerning the question of which of various GM crops may have
caused the ross. There can indeed be different sources of the presence of GMOs.
Then the question arises of how the law should deal with uncertainty when it
cannot be established with certainty who caused the problem. This is especially
its own elements that should be proven by the victim. For a brief summary of the elements of nuisance,
negligence, and strict liability, see Tana N. Vollendorf, Genetically Modified Organisms: Someone is in the
Kitchen with DNA Who is Responsible When Someone Gets Burned?, 21 Miss. C. L. REV. 43, 48-53 (2001).
128. The burden of proof borne by the victim might be reduced if GM products were required to be labeled
with their genetic markers, as has been proposed in Europe. See Endres, supra note 84, at 487.
129. Clapp, supra note 121, at 355-56.
130. Gollier argues that self-interested firms may exploit the favorable asymmetry information for their own
benefits by, for example, introducing their inventions as soon as possible in order to preempt the market of these
products. Christian Gollier, Should We Beware of the Precautionary Principle?, 16 EcoN. Pol'Y 303, 313-314
(2001); see also Christian Gollier & Nicolas Treich, Decision-Making Under Scientific Uncertainty: The
Economics of the Precautionary Principle, 27 J. RisK & UNcERTAINTY 77, 98 (2003) (arguing that under the
situation of uncertainty, competitive firms may introduce their products before fully assessing the possible
impacts of the products). With respect to GMOs, this situation might be indicated by poor pre-market testing of
GMOs or inefficient voluntary control of the release, as illustrated in three cases studied by Clapp. Clapp, supra
note 121.
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true if liability is channeled to the farmers, by which the plaintiff has to prove
which of the neighboring GM farmers has caused the damage. The situation will
be less difficult for the plaintiff if liability is channeled to the seed company, since
the trait of the GM crop is identifiable and usually corresponds to the damage in
question.' 3 1
Potentially, the law could provide a variety of solutions to the causal uncer-
tainty problem. One could, on the one hand, judge that as soon as there is any
statistical chance that a certain activity (or product) may cause certain damage,
all victims receive 100% compensation of their damage.
The second possibility is to refuse the claim of the victim unless there is 100%
certainty that the tort caused the damage.
The third possibility is to award compensation only when the probability that
the damage was caused by the tort passes a certain threshold of, say, 50%. This
threshold rule is a kind of "all or nothing" approach. If the probability is lower
than the threshold, the victim receives no compensation at all; if the probability is
higher than the threshold, the victim receives full compensation. This threshold
rule is known in American literature as the "more probable than not" solution,
referring to the fact that the plaintiff must convince the judge that the damage
suffered was "more probably than not" caused by the tort.1 3 2
The final solution is to take into account the probability that the tort caused
certain damage and to award compensation, considering this probability. This
would mean that if the scientific expertise indicates that the likelihood of damage
is, say, 40%, then the victim can receive compensation for 40% of his damage.
The way the law should deal with causal uncertainty has been addressed
extensively in the economic literature, for instance, by Rosenberg, 3  Kaye,134
and Shavell.135
Let us address more closely the various options addressed above. The first
option would be to award a victim total compensation of damage, even if the
probability that his loss was actually caused by the injurer's activity was
relatively low, say 30%. In such a case, this means that we also know that there is
a 70% probability that the damage (e.g., a certain illness) was caused through
another event. If an injurer is held liable for the full amount even if there is only a
131. To illustrate this situation, one could refer to the StarLink case, in which StarLink corn developed for
animal feed was found in the food supply. In this case, it was not difficult to determine who the responsible
company was, since this patented GM corn was produced by Aventis. However, it was not possible to determine
which particular farmers had caused the co-mingling between the GM feed corn and non-GM food corn. For
detailed information on this case, see Bratspies, supra note 118, at 352-53.
132. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
133. See generally David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984).
134. See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 7 Am. B. FOUND. Rhs. J. 487, 503-16 (1982).
135. See Shavell, supra note 123.
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30% probability that his activity caused a loss, this will lead to too few incentives
to invest in a socially desirable activity, such as the development of genetically
modified organisms.
This shows that the first solution, simply arguing that in the case of causal
uncertainty the victims can claim full compensation, is inefficient and unjust. The
same is true for the second solution in which it would be required that the victim
prove with 100% certainty that his damage has been caused by the tort. That
requirement would mean that in many cases injurers would escape the clutches of
the law, whereas their activities have effectively created an additional risk.
Therefore, that solution would amount to underdeterrence.
This, therefore, leaves us the two other solutions often seen in tort law: either
the requirement that a certain threshold should be passed or proportionate
liability.
Threshold liability leads to a situation whereby the victim's claim is totally
accepted if the probability passes the threshold of, say, 50%. If the probability
passes the threshold, compensation is in full, but if the probability is lower than
the threshold, the victim receives no compensation at all. The disadvantages of
this hard and fast solution are obvious. One problem, both from the victim
compensation perspective as well as from the deterrence perspective, is that the
probability of causation could systematically be lower than the threshold.
Assume that the probability were systematically 40% that a certain cancer was
caused as a result of a certain activity. If the threshold was 50% this would mean
that the enterprise exposing persons to this 40% risk would systematically escape
the clutches of the law. Victims would not be compensated and the incentives
toward accident reduction would be too low.136 This seems inefficient and
probably also unjust, since the enterprise has created certain losses in a number of
cases, at least statistically. Assume that 100 victims all file a lawsuit; in this
particular example, one would assume that 40 out of these 100 cases would have
been caused by the emissions emanating from the particular enterprise. However,
for every individual the probability of causation would always be below the 50%
threshold, so that the enterprise would not be held to compensate the victims in
any of these cases. That is a clear disadvantage of this "all or nothing" approach,
which is inherent in threshold liability.
A more fine-tuned alternative can be found by translating the probability of
causation by awarding the victim a proportionate amount of his damage. In
practice, this would mean that if the probability that the victim's damage was
caused by the injurer's activity was 40%, the victim would be compensated for
40% of his damage. From an economic perspective, the advantage of this
proportionate liability is that it exposes the injurer precisely to the excess risk (in
this case the additional number of cancer cases) that was caused by the (assumed
136. Id. at 588.
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wrongful) activity of the injurer. The enterprise will then, returning to the
previous example, have to compensate 40% of all the damage of every particular
victim, which amounts at the aggregate level to the same as compensating 40 out
of 100 victims whose illness would have been caused by the enterprise.13 1
The result of this proportionate liability is that the injurer receives optimal
incentives for prevention, since he is precisely exposed to liability for the risk that
was caused by his activity.138 Economic literature holds that a proportionate
liability rule therefore provides optimal incentives for accident reduction1 3 9
This proportional liability rule limits the negative consequences of causal
uncertainty. A proportionate liability rule is less rigorous than the all-or-nothing
approach entailed by the reversal of the burden of proof.'4 The proportionate
liability rule would indeed mean that all victims can claim a proportion of their
damage equal to the amount by which the power plant contributed to the loss.
Thus, the exposure to liability of the enterprise corresponds precisely with the
amount to which the power plant contributed to the risk. 141 This proportionate
liability rule could, more particularly in cases of product liability, take the form of
market share liability. 142
V. MULTIPLE TORTFEAsORS
A related problem, also having to do with causal uncertainty, is how one should
handle the situation where multiple actors are involved. This can again have
different sources. It could also be the case that there are potentially many GM
crops that have affected the non-GM crops (if the damage would consist of cross
pollination). The other possibility is that there are various liable actors in the
vertical production chain. But similar questions also arise when damage is caused
to third parties. Again, as with the general issue of causal uncertainty, the law has
basically a variety of options to solve this issue. The most realistic ones (and thus
applied in the legal system) are on the one hand joint and several liability and on
the other hand proportional liability. So-called market share liability, whereby the
137. Id. at 589.
138. LUCAS BERGKAMP, LIABLITY AND ENVIRONMENTr PRIVATE AND PuBLIc LAw ASPECTS OF CIVIL LIABILITY
FOR ENVIRONmENTAL HARM IN AN INTERNATIONAL CoNTExT 290-291 (2001).
139. See John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based on
Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063, 1070-1073 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a
Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 417, 425-431 (1984); Glen 0.
Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 779,784 (1985). For
a discussion of the possible legal foundation of a proportionate liability rule, see Michael Faure & Vronique
Bruggeman, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability, in CAUSATION IN LAw, 105-21 (Tichy ed., 2007).
140. See Gert Briggemeier, Liability for Water Pollution under German Law: Fault or Strict Liability, in
TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUION AND LIABILTEY" THE CASE OF THE RIVER RiUNE 83, 88-91 (Jan M. van Dunnd ed.,
1991).
141. Robinson, supra note 139, at 798.
142. See Pierre Widmer, Causation under Swiss Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION 105, 112-13
(Jaap Spier ed., 2000).
36 [Vol. 23:1
LIABLITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY GMOs
liability is apportioned according to the market share of the operator, is an
example of such a proportionate solution to multi-actor causation. 4 3 In addition
to joint and several liability and the proportional liability, the law might also
solve the problem of multiple tortfeasors by statutorily channeling liability to a
specific party, e.g. the manufacturer of GMOs.
A. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY
At first sight, a joint and several liability rule appears to be a. regime whereby
the legal system deviates from the principle that a tortfeasor should only be held
liable for the damage that was caused by his own behavior. Under joint and
several liability, the tortfeasor is held liable in full also for damage that was not
caused by his own behavior.
Therefore, at first blush, one could argue that a joint and several liability
system seems inefficient, since it leads to overdeterrence. The injurer's liability is
not limited to the risk created by his own activity. However, such a simple
conclusion is (as usual) indeed too simple. One may argue that a distinction
should be made between the situation of full solvency of all the contributing
tortfeasors on the one hand and the situation in which either one or more of them
is insolvent. In case of full solvency of all the actors, one can argue that there is
no efficiency loss caused by joint and several liability.1" In that case, the injurer
who has to compensate the victim can in turn exercise a redress against the other
parties who contributed to the loss in proportion to their contribution. Assuming
that the other tortfeasors are fully solvent, the one who paid first only pre-finances
the compensation of the victim and will be able to recover a part of the damages
paid. Thus, in the end, also under joint and several liability, the extent to which
every contributor has to pay should be proportionate to his contribution to the
risk. In that sense, a joint and several liability rule, combined with a right of
recourse and solvent actors, amounts to a proportionate solution. The exposure to
liability of every tortfeasor in this model is limited to his own contribution to the
loss and thus optimal incentives would follow.
Of course one could wonder what the additional benefit is of a joint and several
liability rule compared to the situation wherein the victim would have to sue
every individual tortfeasor separately. One could make a victim protection
argument, simply on the basis of the fact that for the victim it is often more
difficult to prove a causal link with the action of one particular actor. Thus, it
certainly simplifies procedural matters for the victim if the victim can claim full
143. For a recent overview of the economic literature, see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Joint
and Several Liability, in ToRr LAW AND ECONOMICS 109 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
144. For a detailed analysis of joint and several liability when all defendants are fully solvent, see generally
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831
(1989). For the analysis in case of limited solvency, see generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz,
Apportioning Damages Among Potentially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. LEGAL SruD. 617 (1990).
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compensation from one injurer, who then has to exercise the right of redress
against the other parties who contributed to the loss. However, in addition to this
distributional argument, there are undoubtedly efficiency arguments in this
particular case as well. They are probably not linked to a benefit in administrative
costs. Indeed, whether either the victim has to sue, for example, five different
tortfeasors or the victim just sues one tortfeasor and the latter exercises a right of
redress probably does not create much difference as far as the administrative
costs are concerned. However, one could make the argument that joint and
several liability may give ex ante excellent incentives for mutual monitoring
among potential joint tortfeasors.'4 5 Indeed, victims may well encounter difficul-
ties in proving a causal link between the action of every particular tortfeasor and
the loss he suffered. That may result in too few claims and hence in underdeter-
rence. Shifting the risk to the injurers would mean that they ex ante have an
excellent incentive to mutually monitor their activities. Joint and several liability
in fact shifts the risks of uncertainty concerning the proof of the causal link to the
injurers. The victim can succeed by suing just one of the many potentially liable
injurers and claiming full compensation. If the one injurer who is sued does not
succeed in proving that others contributed to the loss, the damage will ultimately
fall on him.
However, these arguments may not be valid if the tortfeasors are insolvent. 146
In that case, the risk of insolvency is shifted to the injurer who will be sued by the
victim. In that particular case, one would assume that, e.g., only the solvent
injurer is sued by the victim and he has no right of recourse (given the insolvency
of the others). The effect would be that one (solvent) injurer would be held to
compensate for losses that he has not caused. 147 In case of insolvency, joint and
several liability may thus violate the principle that the injurer should only be held
liable to compensate in proportion to the loss.
B. THE CHANNELING OF LIABILITY
One possible solution when various actors are potentially involved is to
impose liability exclusively on one of those parties and to exclude the liability of
all others. For example, this solution has been followed in the nuclear liability
conventions, whereby the liability is channeled to the licensee of a nuclear power
145. An argument in that direction is made by Tom Tietenberg, Introduction and Overview, in INNOVATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY- ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT AND LIABILrrY 1, 5 (T.H. Tietenberg et al. eds., 1992).
146. Boyd & Ingberman argue that under certain conditions extended liability may promote cost internaliza-
tion, but that there are serious drawbacks as well. Hence, they argue that other solutions should be examined to
cure the problem of undercapitalization. James Boyd & Daniel Ingberman, The Vertical Extension of
Environmental Liability Through Chains of Ownership, Contact and Supply, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 44 (Anthony Heyes ed., 2001).
147. Then joint and several liability would lead to overdeterrence, so Bergkamp rightly argues. BERGKAMP,
supra note 138, at 301.
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plant.148 A channeling of liability to the tanker owner can be found in the
conventions concerning damage caused by marine oil pollution; usually this
channeling of liability means that one party is exclusively liable, which means
that victims cannot bring a suit against other parties who might have contributed
to the damage as well.14 9 In the case of GMO liability, the channeling of liability
means that the producer of GMOs will be exclusively held liable for the damage
caused by its product. However, it appears that only a few countries have indeed
statutorily channeled liability to the manufacturer of GMOs. 50
Channeling of liability is sometimes defended as a device that would make the
life of the victim easier. 1 ' The victim would then know ex ante exactly against
whom a law suit would have to be brought and difficult procedural issues in the
case of multi-actor causation could be avoided. Also, it is sometimes argued that
channeling would increase the insurability of particular risks, since only one
party would have to take insurance cover.15 2 Nevertheless, the overall apprecia-
tion of channeling of liability from an economic perspective is rather negative.
Indeed, it has been argued that this channeling is inefficient because it has
perverse effects on the incentives for care where the liability applies exclusively
to one operator.'53 This is the case if channeling means that victims no longer
have the right to sue another party who could influence the accident risk as well.
Excluding that third party from liability is inefficient, because his incentives for
prevention are diluted. That effect is obviously reduced if the licensee or operator
who would be held liable still has a right of recourse against the third party or if a
liability could be passed on the basis of contract, for example. In that case one
could argue that the liability is simply transferred and that such a reallocation
complies with the principles of the Coase theorem. 154
148. Michael G. Faure and Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic
Analysis of the US and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. LAW & PoI'y REv. 219 (2008).
149. Tom Van den Borre, Channelling of Liability: A few Juridical and Economic Views on an Inadequate
Legal Construction, in Nathalie L.J.D. Horbach (ed.), Contemporary Developments in Nuclear Energy Law:
Harmonizing Legislation in CEEC/NIS 13 (Nathalie Horbach ed., 1991).
150. For a discussion on the channeling of liability in several countries, see, e.g., MICHAEL MIGUS, GMO
STATUTORY LIABsLrrY REGIMEs: AN INTERNATIONAL REvIEw, 17-19 (Canadian Institute for Environmental Law
and Policy 2004), available at http://www.cielap.org/pdf/GMOLiability.pdf. The Intergovernmental Committee
for the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety has also compiled several reports from several countries concerning
the application of liability and redress related to damage resulting from GMOs. See generally Intergovernmental
Committee for the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, Compilation of Information on National, Regional, and
International Measures and Agreements in the Field of Liability and Redress for Damage Resulting from the
Transboundary Movements of Living Modified Organism, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ICCP/3/INF/1 (April 2,
2002).
151. Norbert Pelzer, International Pooling of Operators' Funds: An Option to Increase the Amount of
Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability?, 79 NUCLEAR L. BuLL. 37, 46 (2007).
152. Id.
153. For a critical economic analysis of the channeling of nuclear liability, see Van den Borre, supra note
149.
154. See Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics ofNuclear Accident Law, 17 INT'L REV. L.
& EcON. 215, 232-35 (1997).
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However, this private reallocation of liability may not always be possible, and
some of the conventions, moreover, even restrict the possibilities of a right of
recourse. Therefore, channeling can hardly be considered an efficient mechanism
for the prevention of accidents. In addition to this principal economic argument,
one could also argue that at the practical level, channeling of liability might be
difficult to introduce in the area of GMO damage. In case of oil pollution or
nuclear accidents, it is relatively easy to identify one liable party to whom
liability can be "channeled," such as an operator or tanker owner. However, in
cases of damage caused to non-GM crops by GMO crops, it is far more difficult
for the legislator to identify to whom a potential liability should be channeled ex
ante. Hence, in addition to the principal arguments against channeling, one can
equally wonder whether it would be practically possible to implement it.
Channeling of liability to the manufacturer may have great advantages for the
victim, because there can be no doubt as to who is liable when damage is caused
by a GMO. Some of the cases discussed above where the claims were based on
either negligence, strict liability, trespass or nuisance equally showed that in the
absence of a channeling of liability it may in practice be difficult to hold a
manufacturer of GMOs liable. This is clearly indicated in Hoffman v. Monsanto,
in which the dismissals of strict liability, nuisance, and trespass claims were, to
some extent, related to the fact that the defendants were GMO manufacturers, and
not GMO farmers. With respect to the application of strict liability to the case,
Judge Smith argued:
Regardless of whether one considers GM canola a "dangerous substance," or
the field trials for GM canola an "unnatural" or "non-natural" use of land, it is
not reasonably arguable that the commercial release and sale of Roundup
Ready canola seed and Liberty Link canola seed constituted an "escape" of a
substance, dangerous or otherwise, from property owned or controlled by the
defendants in the sense of "escape".required by the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
It is my conclusion that the pleadings do not disclose a reasonable cause of
action based on the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.'5 5
In our opinion, the above argument implies that the strict liability claim is
rejected because merely releasing and selling GM crops cannot be considered an
escape of dangerous substances. Such an interpretation, where the marketing of
GMOs creates the possibility of GM crops cross-pollinating with non-GM crops,
or escaping the control of users once the crops are planted, does not necessarily
lead to strict liability, because strict liability requires that the escape stem from
property owned or controlled by the defendants.
The court also dismissed the nuisance claim on the grounds that liability
cannot be applied to the manufacturer of a damaging substance when the damage
that occurred was beyond the point of sale. In this regard, the court stated that:
155. Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 2005 SKQB 225, 264 Sask. R. 1, para. 97 (Can. Sask. Q.B.).
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The adventitious presence of canola in the crops and on the land of organic
farmers required the intervention of neighbouring farmers who cultivated GM
canola. Holding the defendants liable in nuisance on the basis of the commer-
cial marketing of the product would be equivalent to holding the manufacturers
of pesticide responsible for the nuisance caused by the harmful drift of the
pesticide. While the "release" of the GM varieties of canola by the defendants
may have been a necessary condition for the occurrence of the harm alleged, it
was far from sufficient, in itself.15 6
In the ruling quoted above, the judge considered that the damage requires not
only the sale of GMOs, but more importantly the planting of GMOs. As for a
strict liability claim, the judge seemed to be of the opinion that manufacturers of
GMOs cannot be held liable for the damage simply because they have produced
and marketed the GM product.
Finally, concerning the trespass claim, the court rejected it because "it is clear
that much more than 'natural and inevitable forces' must intervene between
merely marketing GM canola and its arrival on the plaintiffs' land.""' Further-
more, the court concluded that "action in trespass does not lie against the
defendants as the inventors and marketers of GM canola for the adventitious
presence of GM canola in the crops and on the lands of organic grain farmers." 15 8
When liability rules are not applicable to the producers of GMOs, as was
apparent in the Hoffman v. Monsanto case, one may expect that the plaintiffs have
to stage claims against the GM farmers. This is a very unfortunate situation for
the plaintiffs because finding particular GM farmers whose crops have created
damage to the plaintiffs is presumably much more difficult than finding the
producers of those damaging products.
The ruling of Hoffman v. Monsanto has nevertheless drawn many critiques,
which mainly criticize the ruling as being based on a rather narrow interpretation
of liability rules.15 9 Indeed, some of the plaintiffs' claims were rejected not
because the plaintiffs failed to show the evidence that they were injured by GM
crops, i.e., GM canola, but because the liability rules were considered not
applicable to the defendants as the producers of GM canola. In particular, some
critiques argue against a narrow interpretation of the Hoffiman v. Monsanto court
with respect to the issue of "control." Contrary to the court's opinion, the
critiques argue that the producers of GMOs could be held liable for the damage
that occurs after the point of sale, because the producers of GM crops in principle
still have the control over the GM crops through various agreements with the
156. Id. at para. 114.
157. Id. at para. 131.
158. Id. at para. 133.
159. For a general critique against the ruling of Hoffman v. Monsanto, see generally Martin Z.P. Olszynski,
Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada Inc.: Looking for a Generous Approach to the Elephant in the Garden, 16 J.
ENvTL. L. & PIRc. 53 (2005).
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farmers, which determine what can and cannot be done by the farmers. 160
Applying liability to the producers is, thus, similar to applying liability to those
who benefit the most from an activity and those who are in a better position to
control the activity."'
The discussions above show that the desirability of channeling requires a
balanced analysis whereby the pros and cons of channeling need to be taken into
account. Channeling might be a poor tool for inducing the potential injurer to take
necessary preventive measures. However, the absence of channeling might
prevent the victims from staging their claims against the producers of the
damaging GMOs. After all, the cases showed that plaintiffs (suffering losses
resulting from GMOs) are apparently expected to bring their claims against all
potential farmers who could have used the GMO. This not only can create high
costs (litigation) for the plaintiff, but may also mean that the manufacturer will
escape the clutches of the law. Without the possibility of being held liable, or
when such a possibility is decreasing, one may expect that the producers'
incentives to take preventive actions will also decrease.
A disadvantage of channeling is that it would lead to an exclusive liability of
the manufacturer, removing liability from all other parties who also could have
affected the accident risk (more particularly the GMO farmers who, through their
planting methodology, could also affect the risks of commingling and admix-
ture). However, the current absence of channeling should not in all cases bar the
victims' claims against the producers of GMOs whenever they can prove that the
damage is caused by the release and planting of GMOs. Accordingly, liability
rules should be interpreted in such a way that they can be applied not only against
those who use or plant GMOs but also against those who produce and market
GMOs in the first place. In this regard, the StarLink litigation is a good example
of how the liability rules are indeed applicable to GMO producers.
160. It is a common practice in the use of GM crops for farmers to sign agreements with the producers about
how to use the crops, such as those in Monsanto's Technology Use Agreement (TUA). These agreements
indicate that the producers, to some extent, still retain their control over the conduct of their client farmers. The
farmers, for example, are prohibited from saving, reselling, or even sharing the GM seeds with other farmers.
The agreements may also include instructions and directions on how to use the seeds properly. For this reason,
Black & Wishart argue that "contrary to Justice Smith's holding in Hoffman, Monsanto does exercise control
over whether, where, and how its products are cultivated and reproduced, and substantially removing such
control from its client farmers ... it is abundantly clear that Monsanto intends that its transgenic products and
their progeny, in their animate form, should remain firmly under its control at every step of their lifespan." Black
& Wishart, supra note 59, at 420-21.
161. De Beer concludes that the relationship between GMO producers and their client farmers is similar to
the relationship between a landlord and his tenant. Hence, de Beer argues, imposing liability on GMO producers
constitutes the application of vicarious liability, in which those who are in a better position to take care or have
control over a person or object are liable if such a person or object creates harm to others. Jeremy de Beer, supra
note 58, at 293.
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VI. DEFENSES
A. FORCE MAJEURE
A traditional defense accepted in almost every liability regime is force majeure
(although it may have different interpretations). From an economic point of view,
one can easily argue that in the case of force majeure there should be no liability.
Force majeure is generally a condition, not only for fault or strict liability, but for
every liability in tort. It is related to the blameworthiness requirement, which
requires that the injurer should have capacity for tortious liability. A tort will
indeed, according to most legal systems, only make an injurer liable if the
wrongful act is imputable to him.
This condition of blameworthiness relates to the free will and the capacity of
discretion of the tortfeasor.16 2 This blameworthiness requirement also has a clear
economic rationale. When the injurer does not act out of free will, liability cannot
influence his incentives to take care and has, therefore, no economic meaning. A
finding of liability that does not influence the incentives of the tortfeasor will only
create administrative costs (caused by the transfer of the loss) without any
compensating benefits in providing additional incentives to take care.
We refer here to the blameworthiness requirement simply as meaning that the
injurer contributed in some way to the loss. The requirement of 'blame'
traditionally fits into a fault or negligence concept. In fact, in the context of strict
liability, mere causation suffices. But if the injurer did not "cause" the accident,
he should not be held (strictly) liable. Force majeure therefore should remain a
defense, even under strict liability, because a finding of liability makes no sense if
the injurer could not have influenced the risk.
B. DEVELOPMENT RISK
An important question, also with respect to GMO damage, is of course whether
the operator handling GMOs should be allowed to call on the development risk
defense. This would mean that the operator would not be liable if the damage
could, according to the state of the technology at the time when the act took place,
not be foreseen.16 3 One would thus assume that an operator is handling GMOs
and that certain negative consequences of GMOs for third parties could at that
particular moment not be foreseen by the operator. How should, from an
economic perspective, the law deal with situations where either the risks change,
162. Michael G. Faure, Economic Analysis of Fault, in UNIFICAlON OF ToRr LAW: FAULT 311, 322 (Pierre
Widmer ed., 2005).
163. This is also the formulation chosen in the European Directive on Product Liability of July 25, 1985:
liability is excluded if the producer can prove that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the
defect did not exist at the time when the product was put into circulation. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, art.
7(b), 1985 O.J. (L210) 29.
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or technology changes, and the standard of care increases as a result?
One could argue that holding a person liable for an unforeseen damage will not
provide an incentive for an injurer to take more care, because unforeseeability
means that the injurer's subjective perception of the probability of the occurrence
of the damage is zero. In this case, although the injurer has to pay infinite
damages, his expected damage remains zero because the subjective probability of
the damage is zero; and hence his optimal care is also zero. In this regard, holding
an injurer liable for the unforeseen damage could actually reduce social welfare.
However, one may argue that exposing an injurer to liability, regardless of the
unforeseeability of the damage, is efficient as it will induce the injurer to acquire
information in order to prevent the damage. In addition, with regard to the GMOs
case, one could also argue that although the exact magnitude of damage might be
uncertain, the risk of damage caused by GMOs is a real threat.'" In this regard,
Repp argues that GM crop planting is usually undertaken with the contractual
obligation to establish a buffer zone, implicitly showing recognition about at least
the possibility of cross-pollination, but other types of damages cannot be
excluded either. Hence, unforeseeability of GMO damage is relatively hard to
argue. 165
Consequently, it would be simply too easy to state that the tortfeasor will only
be held to comply with the "old" standard of care and will never be liable for risks
he could not foresee. Indeed, it has equally been stated in the literature that the
foresight that there may be liability ex post will obviously give incentives to
obtain information about risk to industrial operators.166
The possibility of ex post liability even if technology changes is one of the
powerful arguments made in law and economics in favor of liability for the
so-called development risk. This should give an operator appropriate incentives
for investments in research to acquire information about risk and about optimal
164. Ellstrand provides several conclusions with regard to gene flow from GM to non-GM crops. First,
mating between crops and their wild relatives is common. In this case, mating between GM crops and non-GM
relatives is also possible. Second, gene flow does not necessarily lead to serious impacts. Third, natural
hybridizations may lead to the problems of increased weediness and invasiveness of some unwanted plants.
Fourth, natural hybridizations may also lead to the risk of extinction of wild relatives. Fifth, gene flow varies
both between species and within species. Sixth, gene flow may occur at high rates and over high distances. See
Ellstrand, supra note 20, at 1166-1168.
165. Richard A. Repp, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically Modified Crop Production and
Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHo L. REV. 585, 615 (2000). A similar opinion has been advanced by Endres, who argues
that the possibility of cross-pollination is supported by some studies showing that transgenic pollen may be
carried by vectors to a great distance even beyond the buffer zone. See Endres, supra note 84, at 487. Lewis also
shares this opinion by arguing that when released into the environment, GM crops may cross-pollinate with
other plants due to wind or animal pollinators; therefore, so the author argues, the risk of cross-pollination "is
almost guaranteed." Stephen Kelly Lewis, "Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?" Corporate Liability for the
International Propagation of Genetically Altered Agricultural Products, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAw 153, 186 (1997).
166. See generally Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 259 (1992); see also Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior and Grandfathering 37 J.
LEGAL STuD. 37 (2008).
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technologies to prevent the risk.
The question, however, arises whether this reasoning can also be used to justify
a retrospective change of a liability rule or changes in the standard of care itself.
The argument is hence a completely different one if both the nature of the risk and
the liability rule change. The economics of tort law assumes that future incentives
for prevention will be affected, given the legal regime in force. Hence, it is hard
to argue that an ex post change in the liability rule will positively affect the
incentives for proper behavior that was not considered wrongful at the time the
act was committed by the industrial operator. One can expect an operator to
assume that new risks may emerge, but hardly that the contents of the law will
change. Requiring this would lead to an inefficiently high demand for preventive
measures and thus to over-deterrence. Thus, retrospective liability indeed seems
problematic, taking into account the deterrent function of tort law.
From this it follows that there is a dilemma: on the one hand it is useful that the
standard-setting process in civil law is seen as a process of learning whereby the
standard of care is not static, but dynamically changes in time.16 7 It would be
wrong to state that due care standards should never change. There may be many
reasons, for instance, new technological insights, leading judges to the efficient
decision that a more stringent standard of care can be applied. This new case law
can, moreover, have an important signaling function for other parties in the
market, who can again, adapt their future behavior. But the question obviously
arises: what should be done with the individual defendant in the particular case in
which a new standard of care is set? Should we sacrifice him for the benefit of a
more efficient standard in the future, and make him retroactively liable, although
his behavior was not considered wrongful at the time when it was committed?
There is a possible way out of this dilemma presented by-inter alia-the
German Supreme Court. 1 6 8 In that particular case, the Supreme Court held that an
operator violated a general duty of care given the fact that technology had
changed. However, at the same time, the Court also held that the operator was not
to blame for the violation of the duty of care, since this was not foreseeable. 169
This approach is known in the American literature as the "prospective overrul-
ing," meaning that a court follows an old duty of care in a particular case (with
the result that there is no finding of liability), but announces that it will follow a
different decision in the future.170 This seems to be both an efficient and a just
167. This argument has been powerfully stressed by Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schafer, Negligence as
Untaken Precaution, Limited Information, and Efficient Standard Formation in the Civil Liability System, 17
INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 15, 15 (1997).
168. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 23, 1984, NEUE JURISTIscHE WOCHEN-
scHRIFr [NJW] [16-201, 1985 (Ger.).
169. Id.
170. This has been defended in Dutch legal literature by 0. Haazen, De temporele werking van een
rechterlijke uitspraak, in DE ROL VAN DE RECHTER IN DE MODERNE WESTERSE SAMENLEVING 171 (Schermers,
Bellekom & Van Kampen eds.,1993).
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solution. On the one hand, a preventive effect is achieved for the future since
future potential tortfeasors know that a new and more stringent due care standard
will apply. On the other hand, it seems fair not to apply this new standard with
respect to the particular defendant in that particular case, who could not have
known that new rules would apply.
In sum, the discussion above makes clear that in fact a distinction has to be
made (although the issues seem to be confounded sometimes) between on the one
hand, a retrospective application of a new liability regime, and on the other hand,
the liability for development risks. A liability regime for risks that are not yet
known today is not necessarily inefficient, precisely because, if this is known in
advance, it will give incentives to require information on these new risks and on
the optimal techniques to prevent the risk. Thus a strict liability, also for
development risks, might provide appropriate incentives for a dynamic invest-
ment in optimal preventive techniques. This however does not justify a retroac-
tive application of new standards or new legislation, which could never have
positively affected future incentives for prevention. In other words, a liability for
development risks is not inefficient as long as it may positively influence
incentives for prevention and as long as the development risk liability is not a
disguised retroactive liability.1
7 1
The justified fear of retroactivity probably explains why legal systems are
often reluctant to introduce liability for development risks. For instance, in the
context of the Product Liability Directive, we can point to Article 7(b), which
explicitly excludes liability if the producer can prove that, having regard for the
circumstances, it is probable that the defect did not exist at the time when the
product was put into circulation.17 2 Moreover, the real "state-of-the-art defense"
is included in Article 7(e), which states that the producer shall not be liable if he
can prove that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time he put
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect
to be discovered.173 However, Article 15.1(b) provided for an option for member
states to nevertheless introduce liability for development risks. 17 4 This option
was only adopted by Luxembourg and Finland."'
As explained earlier, the foreseeability requirement could be relaxed so long as
171. A similar conclusion concerning the efficiency of a development risk defense is reached by Gerhard
Wagner, Haftung und Versicherung als Instrumente der Techniksteuerung, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 1450 (1999).
172. Council Directive, supra note 163, at art. 7(b).
173. Id. at art. 7(e). The state of the art defense has also been addressed in the American context by Boyd &
Ingberman who show that the customary practice test tends to induce inadequate safety, whereas the
technological advancement test tends to induce excessive safety. James Boyd & Daniel E Ingberman, Should
"Relative Safety" Be a Test of Product Liability?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 433 (1997).
174. Council Directive, supra note 163, at art. 15.1(b).
175. A similar option was adopted by Spain for food and medical products as well as by France for products
derived from the human body. See the overview of the transposition in domestic law, provided in the
Commission Green Paper on the Liability for Defective Products, at 35-36, COM (1999) 396 final (July 28,
1999).
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it does not constitute a disguised retroactive liability. It should also be noted here
that the issue of foreseeability of damage resulting from GMOs requires an
analysis of the possible impacts of GMOs. Some impacts will occur with a high
level of certainty, while others may not. Such different levels of certainty
inevitably merit special attention in the discussion of foreseeability.
C. THE FORESEEABILITY REQUIREMENT AND POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF GMOS
Various studies summarized in Section II function as early warnings regarding
the possible impacts of GMOs. In addition, those findings might also serve as
critiques against the safety claims of GMOs. However, despite such findings,
some still argue that the impacts of GMOs are still uncertain. In this case, it
should be noted that any concern or finding regarding the impacts of GMOs
seems to have counter-arguments; such arguments may take several forms. They
may point to the low probability of the impacts of GMOs.' 76 They could also take
the form of arguments against the magnitude of the impacts by showing that the
impacts will be rather limited or isolated."' Others may simply point out that the
risks posed by GMO crops are similar to those posed by non-GM crops.17 8
Taking into account these opposing views, one might argue that scientific
evidence about the possible impacts of GMOs is not conclusive. When damage
does occur in the future, these arguments will certainly serve as a reason to show
that some damage was still scientifically unforeseen at the time of the release of
GMOs.
Whether the level of scientific information available today constitutes evi-
176. The study of Ch6vre et al., for example, observes that under natural conditions, gene flow from GM
canola to its wild relatives is very rare and occurs only at a slow rate. Hence this indicates that the probability of
this GM crop is actually low. See Anne-Marie Ch6vre et al., Gene Flow from Transgenic Crops, 389 NATURE
924, 924 (1997).
177. Some studies, for example, have also found some results contrary to the study of Losey et al., supra note
36, concerning the impacts of Bt crop on Monarch butterfly. These studies point to some methodological flaws
in the Losey et al.'s study to indicate that the study did not place under natural conditions. In addition, they also
show that GM corn pollen actually contains much less Bt toxin compared to that used by Losey et al. Based on
these grounds, these studies conclude that the impacts of GM crops on Monarch butterfly are negligible. See
Jean-Pierre Wisniewski et al., Between Myth and Reality: Genetically Modified Maize, an Example ofa Sizeable
Scientific Controversy, 84 BIOCHIMIE 1095, 1099-1100 (2002); J. Kim Kaplan, Bt Corn not a Threat to
Monarchs, 50 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 16, 16 (2002); Mark K. Sears et al., Impact of Bt Corn Pollen on
Monarch Butterfly Populations: A Risk Assessment, 98 PROC. OF NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 11937 (2001); John
Hodgson, Monarch Bt-Corn Paper Questioned, 17 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 627 (1999).
178. Conner and colleagues, for example, argue that the problems of crop-to-wild hybridizations and their
impacts are not new in agriculture, and cannot be associated only with GMOs. Because the hybridizations are
equally likely to occur both via GM or non-GM crops, the problem of hybridizations should be resolved based
on an agricultural strategy equally applied both to GM and non-GM crops. The authors hence argue that the
impacts will not be more severe and catastrophic than those resulting from non-GM crops. Similarly, they also
argue that some possible impacts such as the effect on non-target organisms, are familiar and inherent not only
with GMOs, but also to all existing agricultural practices. Anthony J. Conner et al., The Release of Genetically
Modified Crops into the Environment, Part II: Overview of Ecological Risk Assessment, 33 THE PLANT J. 19,
28-31 (2003).
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dence to indicate the foreseeability of some damage will depend on how the
courts interpret the foreseeability standard. This will eventually depend on the
courts' interpretation of the level of scientific certainty regarding the impacts of
GMOs.
In this regard, Khoury and Smyth argue that based on the current approach
applied by the courts in considering the foreseeability requirement, the seed
companies are likely to succeed in exercising the unforeseeability defense by
resorting to the current uncertainties concerning the impacts of GMOs. The more
uncertain the impact, the more likely that the company will escape liability.17 9 To
avoid this situation, Khoury and Smyth have proposed the incorporation of the
precautionary principle into liability. They argue that by applying this principle,
the courts will be induced to take into account the current concerns of the impacts
of GMOs. This means that the foreseeability requirement will be somehow
relaxed to allow the courts to appreciate public concerns regarding the impacts of
GMOs. They argue that when the principle is incorporated into the liability
system, "acting in accordance with the prevailing levels of knowledge would no
longer exonerate an individual who could be held liable for omitting to foresee
and prevent risks that although unconfirmed may bring about injury in the
future." 80
D. LIABILITY BASED ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE FOR GMOS?
Khoury's and Smyth's proposal of incorporating the precautionary principle
into liability is similar to Treich's and Gollier's opinion. They argue that in the
face of uncertainty, the threat of liability will prevent strategic behavior of
competitive firms that otherwise will exploit the uncertainty of the damage of
their products in order to gain market control for the products. In this case, firms
will market their innovations as soon as possible without considering the possible
impacts of the innovations. Incorporating the precautionary principle into liabil-
ity thus means that despite current uncertainties concerning some impacts of
GMOs, GM operators will be held liable if these impacts materialize and their
GM products turn out to be toxic.' 8 '
This section will not discuss whether the proposal of incorporating the
precautionary principle into tort is justifiable.18 2 Instead, this section attempts to
179. Khoury & Smyth, supra note 48, at 226.
180. Id. at 228.
181. Gollier & Treich, supra note 130, at 98; Nicolas Treich, What is the Economic Meaning of the
Precautionary Principle?, 26 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INs. 334, 342 (2001). This discussion on the value of
the precautionary principle is of course strongly related to the foreseeability requirement in liability law, just
discussed.
182. It should be mentioned here that the proposal may run against the purpose of the precautionary
principle. Craik and colleagues for example argue that the use of the principle in tort law may not be in line with
the democratization of the decision making process, which constitutes an important message of the principle.
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discuss the possible cost to the GM operator when such a proposal is imple-
mented.
At first glance, one may disagree with the incorporation of the precautionary
principle into tort law because the incorporation will make an injurer liable for
unforeseeable damage. Holding the injurer liable for unforeseeable damage will
not alter the injurer's level of care because the injurer has already underestimated
the damage. Shavell, who interprets unforeseeability as a situation in which the
injurer has subjectively underestimated the probability of damage, argues "inclu-
sion of accident in the scope of liability would not have any effect on the injurer's
behavior-for his behavior is determined by his probability."' 83 The incorpora-
tion of the precautionary principle into liability rules is intended exactly to
remove the foreseeability requirement of liability rules. According to Pardy, the
application of the precautionary principle in tort law serves not only to remove
the requirement of fault, but also the requirement of foreseeability." The authors
conclude that "the precautionary principle is essentially a renunciation of
foreseeability as a relevant consideration."18 5 The application of the precaution-
ary principle to tort law therefore means that applying strict liability and,
simultaneously, removing the requirement of foreseeability from strict liabil-
ity.186 The intended result of such an application would be to force the potential
injurer to increase his subjective probability of an accident. In other words, the
injurer should err on the side of safety. The overestimation of probability is, thus,
preferable to the underestimation of probability.
In our view, incorporating the precautionary principle into tort law may take
two different forms. First, it may take a negligence standard in which the failure
to comply with the precautionary regulatory standard will result in liability. In
this case, the principle is indirectly incorporated into liability in such a way that
the regulatory standard follows the precautionary approach and non-compliance
with the standard will constitute liability. Second, the defendant will be held
liable for any damage because the damage has itself constituted evidence that the
defendant has failed to take the precautionary measures to prevent the damage.
To answer the question of which of these possible applications will impose the
highest cost on individual GM operators, one certainly needs some empirical
They argue that unlike the policy makers, the courts may lack the capacity to address the issue of uncertainty.
Accordingly, they often have to rely on conflicting testimonies. More importantly, the precautionary principle
requires the democratization of the decision making process, such as broad public consultation and participa-
tion. And this process cannot to be done by the courts. Neil Craik et al., Genetically Modified Crops and
Nuisance: Exploring the Role of Precaution in Private Law, 27 BULL. SCI. TECH. & Soc'Y 202, 211-212 (2007).
183. See Shavell, supra note 122, at 490.
184. Bruce Pardy, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Private Persons: Should it Affect Civil and
Criminal Liability?, 43 LEs CAHERs DE DRorr 63, 66-67 (2002).
185. Id. at 67.
186. In fact, Pardy criticizes strict liability applied according to the Rylands and Fletcher rule as a form of
strict liability that is less fault-based (because it does not require fault) but is not truly strict (because it still
requires foreseeability.) Id. at 68.
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research. However, we could expect that the costs for the first and second option
are somewhat different. This is because under the first option, the operator will
meet the regulatory standard in order to avoid liability. Because such a standard
has incorporated the precautionary principle, in the sense that it is established to
prevent some possible impacts, although those impacts are not yet conclusive, the
cost incurred by the operator is the cost of complying with such a precautionary
standard. When the standard of care is left to the operator, the cost will still be the
same since the operator will also take a level of care that may prevent the damage,
which is currently still uncertain. In this situation, the standard literature on the
choice between the negligence rule and strict liability will apply, in the sense that
both systems will induce the potential injurer to take a similar level of care."' 7
The level of care taken by the operator will be different under the second
option, in which the operator will be held liable for any damage simply because
the damage is considered a proof indicating the operator's failure to take
precautionary measure in order to prevent the damage. If this option is imple-
mented, the operator will be forced to consider all damage, whether or not it is
foreseeable. In this situation, at least the operator is induced to continue
increasing its investment in safety in order to avoid the damage. The cost of
taking such measures will certainly be higher compared to the compliance cost
under the first approach.
The result above can be seen in the explanation below.
Assume that the operator of GMOs has already taken some preventive
measures in accordance with various regulatory standards. Under the first option,
in which the non-compliance with the precautionary regulatory standards results
in liability, the operator will have the incentives to take care only up to the level
required by the standards. From an economic perspective this means that the
injurer will stop taking further care whenever the benefits of not taking a higher
level of care, denoted as B, exceed the costs of not taking such a level of care,
denoted as C. Formally this is written as to stop taking further preventive
measures, whenever:188
187. Standard literature in law and economics shows that both systems will result in a similar situation with
respect to the level of care, namely that both will induce the injurer to take the optimal level of care. See ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw & EcoNoMIcs 300-308 (3d ed. 2000).
188. Following Farrow and Hayakawa, the default action in this assumption is to take further preventive
measures, which will stop only when the benefits of not taking further preventive measures are lower than the
costs. According to Farrow and Hayakawa, this assumption about the default action follows the shifting in the
burden of proof as an element of the precautionary principle. See Scott Farrow & Hiroshi Hayakawa, Investing
in Safety: An Analytical Precautionary Principle, 33 J. OF SAFETY RESEARCH 165, 168 (2002). Authors seem to
agree that the precautionary principle requires that the burden of proof or persuasion lie on the party who
proposes a new technology, or who imposes risks of irreversible harms on others, or who intends not to take
safety measures. For discussions about this element of the precautionary principle, see Andy Stirling, Risk,
Uncertainty and Precaution: Some Instrumental Implications from the Social Sciences, in NEGOTIATING
ENvIRoNmENTAL CHANGE: NEW PERSPECIVES FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE 33, 51-53 (Frans Berkhout, Melissa Leach
& Edward Elgar, ed., 2003); see also David Kriebel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental
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B > C,
or
(B/C) = 1 (1)
A question arises whether the operator will have similar incentives for taking a
higher level of care if the operator will be held liable for all occurring damage, as
is proposed under the second option. Following Farrow and Hayakawa, assume
that the benefits of not taking further preventive measures are the avoided
compliance cost, which depend on various uncertain factors such as the develop-
ment of technology. 1 8 9 The decision to stop taking further preventive measures is
also assumed to be irreversible, in the sense that once the decision is found to be
mistaken, it is difficult to correct the decision. The benefits of not taking further
preventive measures will increase over time, with the rate of growth a. These
uncertain benefits are represented by the level of instabilityor, and a stochastic
component dzB. Therefore, with the small increase of time, dt, the benefits of not
taking further preventive measures will depend on both a and 0-, as can be seen in
the equation below:
dB = aBdt + o-BdzB (2)
The cost of not taking further preventive measures is the uncertain damage that
presumably results from GMOs. The damage could be irreversible, in the sense
that once it occurs, the damage is difficult to control. Since the private decision
maker will be held liable for the damage, the costs of not taking further
preventive measures might mean the costs resulting from being held liable. The
costs of not investing in safety, denoted as C, also depend on the level of
instability, represented as A, and the stochastic component, dzc. Hence, the
differential equation of the costs of not taking further preventive measures is:
dC = ACdzc (3)
The objective of the private decision maker is to maximize the discounted
expected payoff between continuing and stopping further preventive measures.
This maximization can be written as:
F(B,C) = E[e -' (B - C)] (4)
Science, 109 ENvT. HEALTH PERSP. 871, 871 (2001).
189. Farrow & Hayakawa, supra note 188, at 169.
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Following this equation, the optimal time to stop taking further preventive
measures is achieved when the ratio between the benefits and costs of not taking
further preventive measures exceeds the precautionary multiplier (F). In this
case, the cost/benefit ratio at optimum time is:
(B/C)* > F (5a)
The value of the multiplier is obtained as:
IF = 001j- 1)
The value of P depends on various factors, such as the discount rate, the level
of uncertainty of B and C, and the level of growth in B.190
Compared to equation (1), equation (5a) requires a higher threshold for ceasing
to take preventive measures. This occurs due to the presence of a precautionary
multiplier in equation 5(a).1 91 With the presence of the multiplier, the benefits of
not taking further preventive measures should be much higher than the costs of
not taking such measures. In equation 5(a), the precautionary principle is applied
in the form of the precautionary multiplier, which functions to increase the
economic requirement for not taking preventive measures.
Comparison between equation (1) and (Sa) also indicates that the second
option, namely that the operator of GMOs will be held liable for any damage
caused by GMOs, will create higher incentives for the operator to continue taking
preventive measures. Another interpretation of this comparison will be that the
second option imposes higher costs on the operator compared to the first option,
because higher a level of care by definition corresponds also to higher compli-
ance costs. This indicates an important message, that the incorporation of the
precautionary principle into liability rules should not be done by eliminating the
unforeseeability requirement, namely by making the prospective defendants
liable for any damage regardless of whether they could previously be expected to
foresee the damage or not. Instead, the analysis above indicates that the
incorporation serves to increase the standard of care under the negligence rule.
This might mean that safety regulations on GMOs should be set in accordance
with some possible impacts of GMOs. Non-compliance with such a precaution-
ary regulation should automatically lead to liability under the negligence rule.
E. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
We indicated above that both a strict liability rule and a negligence rule will
190. The appendix of this paper provides a theoretical explanation on r and (.
191. It is important to note that the value of F should be greater than 1, otherwise the precautionary principle
will not have such a multiplying effect.
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lead to the optimum in cases where the victim's care does not influence the
probability of an accident and where only care (and not the activity level) can
influence the risk. Most accident situations are, however, "joint care" cases. 19 2 In
this situation the risk is also influenced by the behavior of the victim. A simple
strict liability rule would not lead to the efficient result, since the victim has no
incentive to spend on care. To remedy this problem, the victim might be
considered "contributorily negligent" if he does not take due care. A contributory
negligence rule, as known under common law, excludes a right to compensation
for the victim who did not take due care. 193
Assuming that the legally required level of care of the victim is equal to the
efficient level of care, the victim will have the incentive to take optimal care. If
she/he did not take due care he would be found negligent and would receive no
compensation. An efficient result will also follow both under a negligence rule
and under a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence defense. In both
cases the injurer will take efficient care and the victim will (being fully exposed
to the risk), in order to avoid bearing the loss himself, take efficient care as well.
Discussing the economic model of tort law, we therefore indicated that both a
strict liability rule, in combination with a defense of contributory negligence and
a negligence rule (with or without contributory negligence), will give appropriate
incentives to the victim to take efficient care. 194
A comparative negligence rule has the effect of proportionally dividing the loss
between the injurer and the victim, if both committed a fault. Under this rule the
right to compensation will be proportionally reduced if the victim was negligent.
The injurer will still take efficient care to avoid liability, while the victim still
takes care to minimize his own loss.195 The efficiency of this rule is debated in the
literature. Haddock and Curran point to difficulties in analyzing the comparative
benefits of comparative negligence versus a contributory negligence defense. 19 6
It is well known that Posner is an opponent of this rule. 197 According to him, the
rule causes considerable administrative costs, without any compensating benefits
for the incentives to take care. Not only is an intervention of the legal system
necessary to shift a part of the loss from the victim to the injurer, but judges will
also have to examine the faults of both parties and the proportion in which they
192. Although we already argued above that environmental pollution is probably a good example of a truly
unilateral case.
193. For a recent overview of the economic literature in this respect see Mireia Artigot I Golobardes &
Feranado G6mez Pomar, Contributory and Comparative Negligence in the Law and Economics Literature, in
Toler LAW & EcONoMICs 46 (Michael Faure, ed., 2009).
194. See John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 340-342 (1973);
Calabresi, supra note 75, at 663; Landes & Posner, supra note 73, at 880-82.
195. David Haddock & Christopher Curran, An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 49, 59-63 (1985).
196. Id.
197. See RicHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 187-89 (5th ed., 1998).
2010] 53
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENvTL. LAW REVIEw
contributed to the loss. Posner argues that comparative negligence makes
economic sense only when society wants to use the tort system to provide
insurance to accident victims. 19 8
In sum, if a strict liability rule is proposed for GMO damage, a defense should
be permissible to take account of the behavior of the victim, but this can either be
a contributory or a comparative negligence rule. To be clear: a strict contributory
negligence rule, meaning that the victim loses the claim on compensation entirely
in case of his negligence, is practically no longer applied. Most legal systems
have turned to a proportionate reduction of the compensation due to the victim. If
on the other hand a negligence rule is applied to GMO damage, it is not strictly
necessary to add a contributory negligence defense.1 99
VII. REMEDIES
A. DAMAGES IN TORT
Law and economics scholars usually hold that the amount of damages the
injurer should pay should be at least equal to the victim's loss, in order to provide
optimal compensation to the injurer.2 00 These so-called compensatory damages
must be paid to the victim in order to give the victim an incentive to sue, which is
essential to letting the tort system provide an effective and credible deterrent. The
duty to pay compensatory damages to the victim will, moreover, prevent the
victim from taking inefficiently high precautions.2 0 1 If the damages to be paid by
the injurer would fall short of the harm, so that the expected payments would be
below expected harm, the incentives to reduce the risk would be inadequate. 202
Therefore, the starting principle should be that the liable party should pay for
the actual level of loss the victim. 2 0 3 There is extensive economic literature on the
198. RicHARD A. POSNER, EcONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 175 (7th ed., 2007).
199. A contributory negligence defense may arise, for example, in the form of the infringement of patent
right of a GM crops producer. We could refer to the Monsanto v. Schmeiser case, in which the defendant has
been found guilty of the infringement of Monsanto's patent rights for herbicide-resistant canola. See Jeffrey L.
Fox, Canadian Farmer Found Guilty of Monsanto Canola Patent Infringement, 19 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
396, 396 (2001), available at http://www.nature.com/nbt/joumal/vl9/n5/pdf/nbt0501 396.pdf (last visited Jan.
17, 2011). The ruling has, however, been severely criticized as the court ignores the fact that the defendant did
not use glyphosate, an herbicide to which the patented GM canola is supposed to resist. Some authors argue that
if the possession of hybrids containing the patented gene is already a sufficient ground for defendant liability for
the infringement of a patent right, then the question of the defendant's intention should be seriously considered
by the court. Otherwise, a farmer whose land has been contaminated by GM crops and who, unwillingly grows
the hybrids, will be found guilty for the patent infringement. See Maria Lee & Robert Burrell, Liability for the
Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the 'Victim'?, 65 MOD. L. REV. 517, 523 (2002); see also Preston, supra note 14,
at 1167-69.
200. RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 192 (6th ed., 2003).
201. Id.
202. STEVEN SHAVELL, FouNDATIONS OF ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 236 (2004). For a recent overview see
Louis E. Visscher, Tort Damages, in ToRT LAW AND EcoNoMics 153-200 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
203. SHAVELL, supra note 202, at 237.
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question of how life should be evaluated in a tort case, and more particularly, on
the valuation of non-pecuniary losses.20 In addition, economists hold that in
some cases damages should outweigh a low probability of detection and should
therefore be "punitive." The punitive damages are thus meant to provide
appropriate incentives to an injuring party, in a case where, for instance, through
his malicious acts, the probability of the tort being detected would be lower than
one. 2 05
A highly debated issue in the law and economics literature, and an important
issue for damage caused by GMOs, is the extent to which damages should be
awarded for so called pure economic loss. 2 0 6 Economic analysis has provided
explanations for the traditional denial of compensation for pure economic loss in
many legal systems. An important explanation is that an economic loss would
merely lead to a private loss for the victim, but not necessarily to a loss for society
(a so called social loss).207 Compensation of an economic loss that would not at
the same time constitute a social loss would thus, from an economic perspective,
lead to a waste of administrative costs. 2 0 8 A problem is, however, that today
certain differences exist between legal systems concerning the recoverability of
pure economic losses. More recent economic literature still holds that as long as a
damage does not lead to a social loss, but only a personal loss, the traditional
denial of compensation can be justified.2 0 9 However, the large differences
between the legal systems as far as compensation of economic loss is concerned
cannot be fully explained on economic grounds.210
B. INJUNCTION
There is still another question that could be asked in relation to the remedies.
What if the potential victim sees the harm coming or has a case where harm
continues? Can injunctive relief be sought so that the judge can order the injurer
to refrain from the damaging behavior? In this particular case it could mean that
specific measures are ordered by the judge to the injurer to avoid further damage
resulting from the GMO.
Regarding injunctive relief, the economic literature makes a distinction be-
tween the way property rights are protected and the way other rights are
protected. Economists point to the fact that the typical remedy in case of a
204. Visscher, supra note 202, 163-65.
205. For an overview of the economics of punitive damages see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages, in TORT LAW AND EcONOMICs 228-44 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
206. For an excellent economic account see Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, The Economics ofPure Economic Loss
and the Internalization of Multiple Externalities, in 9 TORT AND INSURANCE LAW, PURE EcoNOMIC Loss 167-90
(Willem H. van Boom et al. eds., 2004).
207. Id.
208. See MAURO BUSSANI & VERNON V. PALMER, PURE EcONOMIC Loss IN EUROPE (2003).
209. See Jef De Mot, Pure Economic Loss, in ToRT LAW AND EcoNOMICs 201-14 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
210. Id.
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violation of a property right is an injunction.2 11 Damages are the usual remedy for
torts, whereas injunction is the usual remedy in case of a nuisance (violation of a
property right).2 12 For the case of GMOs this would mean that when a neighbor's
property right (enjoying a non-GM crop) would be endangered by the presence of
a neighbor using GMO, economists would thus predict that the remedy would be
injunctive relief. However, the fact that a property right is granted and that the
victim could theoretically use injunctive relief does not necessarily mean that this
will be the result. The Coase theorem213 predicts that parties may engage in
bargaining, and when transaction costs are low, this is precisely what will happen.
Hence, the injurer may "buy" his right to pollute by paying damages to the
victim. This would of course depend on the potential efficient outcome. But the
Coase theorem holds that if transaction costs are equal to zero, successful
bargaining can cure inefficient laws. Hence, economists consider damages and
injunctions as equally efficient remedies when transaction costs equal zero.2 14
Differences in efficiency thus depend on transaction costs. 2 15 If transaction costs
are high then bargaining may be impossible. In that case, the more efficient
remedy would be damages and not the injunction. The injunction could result in
an inefficient solution, whereas damages could be adjusted to harm done.
Precisely because in a nuisance context where a property right protection is
enforced, transaction costs are relatively low, the typical remedy will be the
injunction. The injunction is particularly more efficient than damages when the
parties can bargain with each other. The reverse is thus true in a high transaction
costs setting, which is typically the tort case. Then economists would predict that
the efficient remedy should be damages and not injunctive relief. This is a finding
in a well-known paper by Calabresi and Melamed, which is often quoted in the
law and economics literature.2 16 They argue as follows:
When there are obstacles to cooperation (high transaction costs), the more
efficient remedy is the award of compensatory money damages;
When there are few obstacles to cooperation (low transactions costs), the more
efficient remedy is the award of an injunction against the defendant's interfer-
ence with the plaintiffs' property.217
They therefore hold that when the nuisance is private and thus few parties are
affected by it the costs of bargaining will be low and the injunction may be the
211. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. RE. 1089 (1972).
212. See ROBERT CooTER & THoMAs ULEN, LAw & EcoNoMacs 100 (4th ed. 2003).
213. See generally Coase, supra note 74, at 1.
214. Id. at 144.
215. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 212, at 104.
216. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 211.
217. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 212, at 104-107.
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preferred remedy. 2 1 8 This then prevents the court from undertaking the difficult
job of computing damages. The injunction in this law and economics perspective
is, however, not viewed as a remedy that would forever prohibit the offensive
activity, but it is viewed as an instruction to the parties to resolve their dispute
through bargaining. In the case of harmful externalities to third parties where
bargaining is often impossible because of high transaction costs, damages will be
the more efficient remedy. Cooter and Ulen therefore hold that in choosing
between injunctions and damages the court will have to examine the number of
people affected by the externality. Only when the number of affected parties is
low (this can often be the case with GMO damage) may injunctive relief be
warranted.219
If the court, however, tends to apply a permanent injunction and damages, the
results may be different. The court should consider the social value of GM crops
compared to the harms suffered by non-GM crops farmers. In this case, the court
might look at the benefits of GM crops in general, ranging from increasing
productivity to serving as a solution to provide cheap and nutrition-rich food for
the world. These benefits should, of course, be compared with the perils of GM
crops and with the needs to provide non-GM products as an alternative for
society. In particular, the benefits to individual GM farmers may be compared
with the damage suffered by individual non-GM farmers. If the value of GM
crops exceeds the harms suffered by non-GM farmers, then permanent damages
are a preferable remedy. This is because, as the potential Pareto criterion
suggests, efficiency means that the winner still gains after compensating the
loser, and because GM crops, which are highly beneficial to society, are too
important to be permanently stopped. An injunction to stop the use of GM crops
may in that case be inefficient.
C. FINANCIAL CAPS?
A further question that could be asked, as far as damages and remedies are
concerned is whether there is any argument to putting a financial cap or limit on
the amount of damages due to the victim. To answer this question, again a
distinction has to be made between the contracts case (where ex ante bargaining
is possible) and the tort case (where the victim is a third party and hence
bargaining is impossible). In the case of a contract, parties could of course agree
ex ante to limit damages due to a specific amount which could be less than the
actual loss suffered by the victim. If that were the case it would be an explicit
agreement concerning allocation of risk which would undoubtedly also have an
effect on the price agreed between the parties. In that particular case, there could
be no objection against a limit. In fact, it amounts to liquidated damages, an
218. Id.
219. Id. at 168-69.
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amount of damages ex ante agreed by the parties in case of breach of contract.
A limitation of liability is far more complicated in the tort case. In the
literature, it has been indicated that there may be good reasons to favor a strict
liability rule for major industrial accidents,22 0 the main reason being that only a
strict liability rule would lead to a full internalization of those highly risky
activities. 2 21 This strict liability rule is especially put forward in a so-called
unilateral accident situation, where only one party influences the accident risk.
Only with strict liability would the potential injurer also have an incentive to
adopt an optimal activity level. This full internalization is obviously only
possible if the injurer is effectively exposed to the full costs of the activity he
engages in, and is therefore in principle held to provide full compensation to a
victim.
An obvious disadvantage of a system of financial caps is that it would seriously
impair the victim's rights to full compensation. If the cap is indeed set at a much
lower amount than the expected damage, it would not only violate the victim's
right on compensation, but the above-mentioned full internalization of the
externality would not take place either. From an economic point of view, a
limitation of compensation poses a serious problem, because there will be no
internalization of the risky activity. Indeed, if one believes that the exposure to
liability has a deterrent effect, a limitation of the amount of compensation due to
victims poses another problem. There is a direct linear relationship between the
magnitude of the accident risk and the amount spent on care by the potential
polluter. If the liability, therefore, is limited to a certain amount, the potential
injurer will consider the accident as one with a compensation ceiling. Hence, he
will spend on taking care to avoid an accident caused with a magnitude equal to
the limited amount, and he will not spend on the care necessary to reduce the total
accident costs. Obviously, the amount of care spent by the potential injurer will
be lower and a problem of under-deterrence arises. The amount spent on optimal
care, reflected in the optimal standard, as the care necessary to reduce the total
accident costs efficiently, will be higher than the amount the potential injurer will
spend to avoid an accident equal to the limited amount.2 22 Thus, as a result of the
cap, too little care would be taken.22 3
The conclusion, however, is different in the case of bilateral accidents, where
220. Above, we argued that it will depend upon the specific circumstances of the case whether there is an
argument in favor of strict liability for GMO damage. A crucial factor in that respect is the respective
contribution of both injurer and victim to the risk of GMO mixture. We therefore assume here that the influence
of the injurer is more important and that, therefore, the legal system has adopted a strict liability rule.
221. Shavell, supra note 75, at 8; Shavell, supra note 123, at 603.
222. See Michael Faure, Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear Accidents:
Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, 2 EuR. J.L. & EcoN. 21 (1995).
223. The reason for the underdeterrence is the same as for the underdeterrence that results from the
insolvency of the injurer. Underdeterrence arises because the injurer is not exposed to full liability, either as a
result of his insolvency or as a result of a cap.
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the victim's behavior may also affect the accident risk. The standard argument
against providing full compensation to victims (also of non-pecuniary losses) in
the case of bilateral accidents is that victims can take precautionary measures
which are not always observable for judges and which can therefore not be fully
accounted for in contributory or comparative negligence defenses.2 24 A limit on
the compensation in the case of bilateral accidents iMay, therefore, be useful in
cases where victims should be given additional incentives to reduce the accident
risk. Whether caps are efficient in specific bilateral accident cases will depend on
the circumstances. The question arises-inter alia-whether exposing the victim
to risk is indeed necessary to provide these additional incentives or whether the
victim's incentives can be optimally controlled via the contributory negligence
defense. Also, the amount of the cap remains important. If the cap were set too
low, it would give incentives to the victim, but it could equally lead to serious
under-deterrence of the injurer.
D. COMPULSORY INSURANCE?
Another question is of course whether there is an economic argument to force a
potentially liable GMO producer to seek insurance coverage. This, again, is an
issue that has received a significant amount of attention in the law and economics
literature. We will of course not summarize all of this literature within the scope
of this study, but merely state the most important argument in favor of compul-
sory insurance from an economic perspective.22 5 The most important argument
for introducing compulsory liability insurance relates to the insolvency problem.
The argument goes that the magnitude of the harm will often exceed the
individual wealth of an injurer, whereby a problem of under-compensation of
victims will arise. Hence, lawyers would push forward compulsory insurance as
an argument for guaranteeing an effective compensation to the victim.
It is, however, also possible to make an economic argument that insolvency
will lead to under-deterrence problems, which may be remedied through liability
insurance. Indeed, this so-called "judgment-proof' problem has been extensively
dealt with in the economic literature.22 6 If the expected damage largely exceeds
the injurer's assets the injurer will only have incentives to purchase liability
insurance up to the amount of his own assets. He is indeed only exposed to the
224. This point has been made by Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 35, 505-52 (1982); Michael Adams, Warum kein Ersatz von Nichtvermagensschaiden, in
ALLOKATIONSEFFIZIENZ IN DER RECHTSORDNUNG, 214 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schdlfer eds., 1989), Claus Ott &
Hans-Bernd Schifer, Schmerzensgeld bei Korperverletzungen, Eine dkonomische Analyse, JURISTENZEITUNG,
564-565 (1990). See also Michael Faure, Compensation of Non-pecuniary Loss: An Economic Perspective, in
EUROPEAN ToRr LAW, LIBER AMICORUM FOR HELMuT KOZIOL 143-159 (Magnus & Spier eds., 2000).
225. For a more detailed discussion see Michael Faure, Economic Criteria for Compulsory Insurance, 31
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 149, 149-68 (2006).
226. See generally Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 43,43-58 (1986).
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risk of losing his own assets in a liability suit. The judgment-proof problem may,
therefore, lead to under-insurance and thus to under-deterrence. Jost has rightly
pointed out that in these circumstances of insolvency, compulsory insurance may
provide a better outcome.2 27 By introducing a duty to purchase insurance
coverage for the amount of the expected loss, better results will be obtained than
with insolvency whereby the magnitude of the loss exceeds the injurer's
assets.228 In the latter case the injurer will indeed only consider the risk as one
where he could at most lose his own assets and will set his standard of care
accordingly. When he, under a duty to insure, is exposed to full liability, the
insurer will obviously have incentives to control the behavior of the insured. Via
the traditional instruments for the control of moral hazard, the insurer can make
sure that the injurer will take the necessary care to avoid an accident with the real
magnitude of the loss. Thus, Jost and Skogh argue that compulsory insurance can,
provided that the moral hazard problem can be cured adequately, provide better
results than they could under the judgment-proof problem.
Indeed, this economic argument shows that insolvency may cause potentially
responsible parties to externalize harm: they may be engaged in activities that
may cause harm that can largely exceed their assets. Without financial provisions
these costs would be thrown on society and would hence be externalized instead
of internalized. Such an internalization can be reached if the insurer is able to
control the behavior of the insured. This shows that if the moral hazard problem
can be cured adequately, insurance leads to even higher deterrence than a
situation without liability insurance and insolvency.
Notwithstanding this advantage of liability insurance, the literature has pointed
equally to many dangers of compulsory insurance, and has thus formulated
several warnings.229 They can be summarized as follows:
Compulsory insurance should only be introduced when there is a sufficient
supply of differentiated insurance policies on the market. This supposes that
sufficient competition within insurance markets exists, and that operators have
the possibility to actually seek coverage.
Therefore, compulsory insurance should only be introduced when sufficient
information is available to insurers on the particular risk that will be covered. If
too little information is available on the risk, the risk may be uninsurable, or the
risk premium (to account for insurers ambiguity) may be so high that the insured
227. Peter J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.
259, 259-70 (1996). A similar argument has been formulated by Mattias K. Polbom, Mandatory Insurance and
the Judgment-Proof Problem, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45-58 (1998) and by Goran Skogh, Mandatory
Insurance: Transaction Costs Analysis of Insurance, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND EcONoMICs 521-537
(Bouckaert & De Geest eds., 2000). Skogh has also pointed out that compulsory insurance may save on
transaction cost.
228. Howard Kunreuther & Paul Freeman, Insurability, Environmental Risks and the Law, in THE LAW AND
ECONoMIcS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 316 (Heyes ed., 2001).
229. See Faure, supra note 225.
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are unwilling to pay such a high premium. .
Information on the risk for insurers is also crucial since insurers need to be able
to control the moral hazard problem through an appropriate risk differentiation.
Compulsory insurance should never be accompanied with a duty to accept
particular risks or operators that would be imposed on insurers. An insurance
company should, in principle, always keep the possibility to refuse coverage to
particularly high-risk individuals. Such a refusal by an insurer can be an
instrument of risk differentiation, necessary to remedy moral hazard.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our paper aimed at analyzing the liability for potential damage resulting from
GMOs. As we showed in Section II, notwithstanding the beneficial effects, the
use of GMOs can potentially also lead to substantial damage, although many of
the consequences are still uncertain. The first cases concerning damage caused by
GMOs have also already been tried before (mainly United States) courts. Most of
these cases concerned claims by organic farmers that their products were
negatively affected by the presence of GMOs (so-called commingling or admix-
ture).
Although there are already several contributions dealing with liability for
damage caused by GMOs, the central goal of our paper was to address this issue
from the perspective of the economic analysis of law. We showed that it is
important to distinguish on the one hand the situation where damage results from
admixture (between GMO and non-GMO crops) and where damage has been
caused to third parties.
The main difference between the two situations is that in the first case, there
may be a contractual relationship between injurer and victim, which may, from an
economic perspective, call for the application of the so-called Coase Theorem.
However, when damage is suffered by third parties, transaction costs are
prohibitive, and hence the legal system will have to intervene to determine how to
internalize the externalities resulting from the GMO liabilities.
There is, however, one case where the Coase Theorem and contractual liability
may still play a role, which is product liability. As we indicated, the economic
analysis of product liability relies heavily on assumptions concerning the ability
of a victim to obtain accurate information about the product risk. The victim
would, taking into account the potential damage and hidden defects, only base his
decision on the full price of a product. However, given the fact that many victims
may be uninformed of potential product defects, this analysis may not be very
useful. It was particularly for that reason that economic theory showed that in the
case of underestimation of the risks by consumers, strict liability may be an
appropriate liability rule. Only strict liability provides incentives to manufactur-
ers to adopt both an optimal care level as well as an optimal activity (production)
level.
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Most cases in practice concerned the situation where the victims were not
consumers of the GMO, but were rather third parties and more particularly
neighbors (organic farmers) from farmers using GMOs.
This is typically also the case when damage is caused to the environment and
where the "victim" may be the government, who sues on behalf of the environ-
ment. Given the fact that in those cases it is unlikely that the victim itself may
have a great influence on the accident risk, economic analysis predicts that these
are cases where also a strict liability rule may be warranted. We indicated that this
may be different only in the situation where the victim may not be an individual
but rather a corporate entity. In those cases, corporations can sometimes also take
measures to reduce risks, which would make the situation bilateral. In that case,
liability rules should also provide incentives to the potential victim to adopt
optimal care and activity levels. The strict liability rule is thus most likely
indicated when individuals are victims, whereas negligence may be indicated in
bilateral situations where both injurer and victim are corporate entities who could
take adequate measures to reduce the risk.
We also indicated that to a large extent, regulation will have an important
influence on the scope of liability. However, economic analysis indicates that
whereas a breach of regulation may give rise to a finding of liability, the reverse is
not necessarily true: following a regulatory standard (e.g., concerning the way in
which one should deal with the GMOs) does not necessarily reduce or exclude
liability. Indeed, it is quite possible that the efficient care standard is higher than
the level required under regulation. For that reason, it is important to still hold the
potential injurer liable even if he followed the regulatory standard. Thus,
supplementary incentives could be provided through the complementary use of
liability rules.
An important problem in any environmental liability case and also in the case
of damage suffered as a result of exposure to GMOs is the issue of causation. The
few cases that have already dealt with GMO liability show that causation is an
important issue to be dealt with in case law. We indicated that economic analysis
proposed the use of a proportionate liability rule to deal with uncertainty over
causation. The advantage of this approach is that the inefficiency and unfairness
of so-called "all-or-nothing" approaches are avoided, and the injurer is exposed
precisely to the extent that he contributed to the risk. Moreover, a proportionate
liability rule has the advantage of allowing the judge to simply follow the
indications provided by experts on the likelihood that a specific damage was
caused by an exposure to GMOs.
We pay specific attention to the influence of uncertainty of liability for damage
caused by GMOs by asking the question of whether the precautionary principle
could have an influence in the liability setting.
In addition, with respect to the unforeseeability defense, we observe that the
foreseeability requirement could take into account some possible damage by
GMOs that have been discussed. Since the prevailing uncertainties on these
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impacts may serve as evidence for the unforeseeability of the impacts, applying
the precautionary principle might induce the courts to lower their foreseeability
requirement. In this case, the currently available findings on these impacts
function as early warnings to indicate that these impacts are foreseeable by the
present state of knowledge. However, if the application of the precautionary
principle is interpreted as holding the GM operator liable for any damage simply
because the damage is itself the evidence indicating the failure to take the
precautionary measure, the cost incurred by the GM operator will be high
because the operator will be induced to continue taking higher levels of care. The
operator will stop doing it only if the benefits of not taking higher level of care are
much higher than the cost of taking the higher level of care.
We also addressed the question of channeling liability. Generally, economists
have a negative impression of exclusive channeling, suggesting that it is ineffi-
cient with a specific operator (or problematic from an economic perspective).
This is understandable to the extent that it means others besides the channel party
could no longer be held liable and thus would have no incentives for risk
reduction. On the other hand, some of the court cases have shown that it was not
always easy to construe a case against the manufacturer of GMOs, which would
effectively lead to forcing potential victims (often neighboring farmers) to sue all
other farmers from which the source of the admixture could come rather than the
producer of the GMO who was at the source of the problem. This could be solved
by a channeling wherein the GMO producer would be the primary liable party.
This makes sense to the extent that the producer can monitor the use of GMOs by
its customers (the farmers) via specific agreements that also provide, for ex-
ample, how particular crops have to be planted. However, a channeling of
liability to the manufacturer should not necessarily mean that it is an exclusive
channeling, excluding liability of all other parties involved.
As far as defenses are concerned, we indicated that undoubtedly contributory
negligence may play an important role, especially in those cases where victims
can have an influence on the accident risk. If a strict liability rule were
introduced, it is important to add a contributory negligence defense.
Of course the liability for damage caused by GMOs is a very complex issue,
and we were therefore not able to discuss all potential aspects. One important
aspect not addressed in our paper is how to deal with damage of a transboundary
nature resulting from GMOs. There is surely a reason to address this issue since
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has urged the Parties of the Protocol to adopt
rules and procedures on liability and redress for transboundary damage resulting
from the release and movement of GMOs. In this regard, the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and Redress in the Context of
the Cartagena Protocol has discussed some proposals on various issues regarding
liability and redress, including the standard of liability, compensation mecha-
nisms, and the definition of transboundary damage. In our view, economic
analysis on those proposals are of paramount importance to the discussions in
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Working Group because the analysis could provide the Working Group with
information concerning the rules and procedures that could offer the optimal
protection for the potential victims and give incentives for the potential injurers
to take the optimal preventive measures.
Another issue is how adequate compensation for damage caused by GMOs
could be provided. We stressed the role of liability rules and liability insurance in
that respect, but other instruments (first party insurance, compensation funds)
could also serve a role. These, and undoubtedly other aspects, certainly merit
further research.
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IX. APPENDIX
In the text, it was explained that the benefits of not investing in safety and the
costs of not conducting safety measures depend on the degree of growth rate and
the level of uncertainty. At time t, those benefits and costs are:
dB = aBdt + o-BdzB (1)
dC = ACdzc (2)
Stochasticities in the above equations are represented by dzB and dzc, of which
correlation is defined by the following expectation equation:
E[dzcdzB] = 6dt (3)
As explained in the text, the objective of the decision maker is to maximize the
payoff between B and C. Hence, the objective can be written as:
F(B,C) = E[e -'(B - C)] (4)
B / BLet x - and let also F(B, C) = Ch(x) = Ch x = C/
Hence, equation (4) can be rewritten as:
Ch(x) = Ch x = C F(B, C) = E[e P'(B - C)] (5)
= CE e P(B- 1)] (5.1)
= CE[e - P'(x - 1)] (5.2)
The derivative of F(B,C) with respect to t is
aF.
at pe -P(x- 1) pCh(x) (5.3)
Equation (5.1) can also be written as:
(x B) F(B, C) CE[e-P t (x- 1)](
h~ ) )]=E[e - P'(x - 1)](6C C C
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Consider that F(B, C) = Ch(x) = Ch(x = C , which means:
aF OF ax
OF axCh(x) | Ox
OC OC h(x) + C h'(x) - = h(x) - xh'(x)aC aCI aC]
Using It6's lemma to dF (B,C), we find:
OF OF OF 1O/OaFVOB V B 1O8 OF\dF(B,C -at dt + aB dB + BFdC + 2 \ ±-2aI -dt + 2 aC\I /
at OR aC 20aBOBI\OZB/\OZB/ 20C\OC/
( C C)\1 + 1 0 (OF) aB C 1 O aF B C
OZc; \Zc/dt + 2 0B \oC) OZB ZC 20B \C) OZBO ZC
OF OF OF 1 02F aB 2  2 (ac( 2 a 2F
-dt + dB + dC + - dt+ c dt +
at OB OC 20B2 8Z 2 C Zc OBOC
aB C
8Z- Zc dt (8)
Consider now equations (1) and (2):
dB = aBdt + oBdZB
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Equation (8) can be rewritten as:
dF(B,C) = - pCh(x)dt + h'(x)dB + [h(x) - xh'(x)]dC + 2 h"(x).C (oB)2dt +
1 x2
Sx C)2 -xh"(x).oB)(AP)(dt = -pCh(x)dt + h'(x)dB + [h(x)- h"(x). (AC)dt +± W()
1 1
-xh'(x)]dB + 2 h"(x).Co dt + 22 C2Ch\(x)dt-x2Coh"(x)dt (10.1)
Since dB = aBdt + YBdzB, and dC = ACdzc, equation (10.1) can be rewritten
as:
dF(B,C) = - pCh(x)dt + h'(x)aBdt + h'(x)oBdzB + [h(x)
11
- xh'(x)]ACdzc + 2 h"(x).x 2 Cc 2 dt + 2 x 2 2Ch"(x)dt - x 2 Co-Ah"(x)(dt22
(10.2)
As stated earlier, the objective of the decision maker is to maximize the payoff
between B and C. This objective is expressed in terms of the expected value
between B and C in equation (4). This is an important assumption because, by
definition, the expected value of Brownian motion is zero. As a result, all
expressions in equation (10.2) that contain the properties of Brownian motion,
namely dzC and dz, should equal to zero. Hence, equation (10.2) can be
rewritten as:
dF(B,C) = -pCh(x)dt + h'(x)aBdt + 2 h"(x)x 2Co 2dt +
1
+ 2 x 2 A2 Ch"(x)dt - x 2Ccr.h"(x)6dt (10.3)
2
= -ph(x) + axh'(x) + 2 {x 2 2h"(x) - 2(Aux 2h"(x) + x 2 X2 h"(x)}
(10.4)
Defining dF = 0, we find:
-ph(x) + axh'(x) + {x 2 0.h"(x) - 26Ao-x2h"(x) + x 2A2 h"(x)} = 0
(11)
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The boundary conditions for equation (11) are:
h(x*) =h* - 1
h'(x*) = 1
A natural solution of equation (11) is h(x) = Ax, where:
x'
h'(x) = PAx = PA-
x
xp
h"(x) = 13( - 1)Ax(P 2 ) = 1(1 - 1)A2
x.
Substituting this solution and its derivatives into equation (11), we find:
X l x x
- pAx + axpA - + 2 x p( - 1)A p 2Exfo-AP(p - 1)A p + iA2 13
(p - 1)A x3 = 0 <* 2 (o-2 - 2(trAk + A2)12 _ 2 (a - 2 oA + A2)
(3-p=0 (12)
From equation 12, we find the value of P as follows:
(a - 2oA + A 2)
2 )
(2- 2A + 2
2 / - o+
(o- - 2(o-A + A') (13)
Let us now reconsider the boundary conditions for equation (11), namely:
h(x*) h* - 1 (14a)
h'(x*) 1 (14b)
A natural solution of equation (11) is h'(x) = A(x*), where:
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x*
h'(x*) = i3A(x*) - P=A x* (14c)
Substituting (14c) into (14b):
x* 13  x*
PA - 10l=Ax* - (14d)
Substituting (14d) into (14a):
x*(
- x* - 1>x* -1(14e)
B
Since x = , equation (14e) means that:
B 3
C P -1 (15)
In equation (15), the right hand expression, x* - functions as the
)3- 1
precautionary multiplier I for cost-benefit ratio.
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